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1 Introduction
Fiscal policy in Europe is carried out in times of increased economic and political integra-
tion. Understanding the behavior and the role of states, sub-national governments, courts,
companies and citizens in this integrated and interdependent environment is important in
order to design optimal public policies and institutions. The field of public economics con-
tributes to this task by analyzing how government policies affect the economy. This thesis
adds to different strands of the public economics literature and consists of four self-contained
chapters.
The chapters’ contributions cover the following topics: fiscal rules, tax competition, tax
neutrality and the European Court of Justice, and spillovers in direct democracy. The fiscal
policy challenges underlying all these topics originate from the existence of multiple gov-
ernmental jurisdictions – either in a national or international context. In the chapters at
hand, this gives rise to (1) bailout expectations of states within a federation, (2) tax compe-
tition between countries, (3) tax neutrality challenges across countries, and (4) interactions
in direct democracy between municipalities.
Chapter 2 is on the effectiveness of fiscal rules in general and the debt brake in the
German states in particular.1 The effectiveness is assessed by analyzing how fiscal rules
influence deficit expectations of policy makers. In a first step, we introduce a dynamic
model in an environment characterized by the lagged implementation of a new rule. In a
second step, we analyze a unique survey of members of all 16 German state parliaments,
and show that the debt brake’s credibility is far from perfect. In addition, we find a robust
1 This is joint work with Friedrich Heinemann, Eckhard Janeba and Christoph Schro¨der. The paper has
been published by the Journal of Public Economics in October 2016 (Heinemann et al., 2016). My
co-author Christoph Schro¨der also uses this paper in his doctoral thesis (Schro¨der, 2016). An earlier
version of the paper has been circulated as ZEW discussion paper (Heinemann et al., 2014).
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asymmetry in compliance expectations between insiders and outsiders (both for in-state vs.
out-of-state politicians and the incumbent government vs. opposition dimension).
To put into context, the debt brake in the German states was introduced after decades
of accumulation of debt. Federal states built up debt for various reasons, including bailout
expectations and missing tax autonomy. These sub-national jurisdictions may rationally
expect to be bailed out by the federal government in case of default. This is even more
pronounced when federal states are constrained to raise their own tax revenues. Similarly,
our results suggest that if taxes are harmonized and common budgets become more frequent,
bailout expectations could also prevail at the European level. This is an interesting nexus
between studies on fiscal policy in federations (Chapter 2) and in supranational organisations
(Chapter 3). Vice versa, giving more tax autonomy to sub-national jurisdictions may induce
tax competition within federations similar to tax competition between countries.
Chapter 3 deals with the interaction effects which arise when countries have full tax
autonomy.2 The chapter analyzes European and global tax competition in the context of
decreasing corporate taxes in Europe during the last decades. The literature has identified
tax competition as one reason for this decline in corporate tax levels. This study analyzes
in more detail whether the decline in corporate tax levels in Europe is mainly driven by tax
competition between EU member states or whether is it (also) due to pressure from other
world regions. The results of this study, which makes use of tax reaction functions applying
an instrumental variable approach, indicate that there is evidence for tax competition within
Europe, whereas there is no robust evidence that European countries compete with countries
from other world regions.
The results can serve as input for further discussions and research on the desirability
and design of corporate tax harmonization in Europe. However, as long as there is no far-
reaching coordination or harmonization legislation agreed on, the European Court of Justice
2 An earlier version of this chapter has been circulated as ZEW discussion paper (Streif, 2015).
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(ECJ) plays a prominent role in securing a certain degree of coherence and neutrality of tax
systems in Europe. While the constitutional treaties leave direct tax jurisprudence in the
hand of the member states, they need to adhere to the fundamental freedoms stipulated in the
treaties. The ECJ enforces the fundamental freedoms if member states apply discriminatory
tax treatments to cross-border economic activity.
Chapter 4 analyzes whether or not the ECJ’s decisions indeed increase tax neutral-
ity and therefore contribute to the achievement of the internal market.3 This is done by
considering a ruling from 2006, in which the ECJ limited the applicability of specific tax
rules in the EU (controlled foreign company rules; short: CFC rules). They are intended
to prohibit multinationals’ excessive use of subsidiaries in low-tax countries. We apply the
effective tax burden model of Devereux and Griffith (1999) to assess the effects of the ECJ’s
ruling on tax neutrality. Our results show that the court’s restriction of CFC rules and the
emergence of low tax regimes for income from intellectual properties (IP boxes) cast doubt
on the seemingly positive effects the ECJ has on reducing tax distortions.
Chapter 5 switches the focus to direct democratic institutions and, more specifically,
to mimicking behavior across local jurisdictions in direct democracy.4 This is related to a
sizeable literature which studies whether governments strategically interact with each other
through learning, coercion, yardstick or fiscal competition, such as tax competition in Chap-
ter 3. This study asks whether – in the presence of direct democratic institutions – spatial
interactions among political jurisdictions additionally result from voters’ direct democratic
activities. The proposed mechanism is that the voters’ direct democratic actions can poten-
tially have spillover effects on the actions of voters in neighboring jurisdictions. Utilizing
data on German municipalities and applying an instrumental variable strategy, we find that
3 This is joint work with Rainer Bra¨utigam and Christoph Spengel. An earlier version of this chapter has
been circulated as ZEW discussion paper (Bra¨utigam et al., 2015).
4 This is joint work with Zareh Asatryan and Annika Havlik. An earlier version of this chapter has been
circulated as ZEW discussion paper (Asatryan et al., 2015).
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a jurisdiction’s probability of hosting a petition is positively driven by the neighbors’ direct
democratic activity.
This analysis contributes to the literature on mimicking between jurisdictions and opens
up a potentially new explanation why public policies interact across jurisdictions. This is
suggested by the literature which shows that direct democracy matters for fiscal outcomes.
The recent vote on the Brexit in the United Kingdom illustrates in more general terms how
direct democracy in one jurisdiction can have various direct and indirect spillover effects to
other jurisdictions.
Finally, Chapter 6 discusses a number of relevant policy implications arising from the
chapters’ findings.5
5 To a great extent, this chapter directly bases on the joint work cited in this introduction.
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2 Fiscal Rules and Compliance Expectations -
Evidence for the German Debt Brake
2.1 Introduction
Constitutional fiscal rules have been used for decades in federal countries such as Switzerland
and the US states to limit deficits and debts of sub-national jurisdictions (for a survey of
current fiscal rules see International Monetary Fund, 2012). On the national level, the euro
area debt crisis has triggered a wave of new statutory and constitutional budget constraints.
For example, the Fiscal Compact, accepted by 25 EU member states in 2012, has been
another milestone for the spread of numerical fiscal constraints where the signatory countries
commit to the introduction of national debt brakes (see European Council, 2011).
A key argument in favor of numerical fiscal rules is that they can contribute to credible
fiscal strategies, boost borrower reputation and anchor long-run expectations about future
government public finances and, ultimately, solvency (International Monetary Fund, 2009).
Hence, expectation effects of fiscal rules are a natural yardstick to assess a rule’s potential
effectiveness in the future. A credible rule affects expectations of very different players
both in the private sector (e.g., investors in government bond market) and the public sector
(e.g., political decision makers). While a limited literature exists covering private investors’
expectation effects and the impact of rules on government bond risk premia (e.g., Heinemann
et al., 2014; Iara and Wolff, 2014), analyses on politicians’ expectations are completely
missing.
We contribute to filling this gap, and to the best of our knowledge, we are the first
to examine expectation effects of a fiscal rule for fiscal policy makers themselves. These
effects are of direct importance as actual budgetary decisions are more likely to be affected
if a rule enjoys credibility with actual policy makers. Expectations of politicians who are
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constrained by a rule form a key intermediary step between fiscal rules on the one hand and
fiscal outcomes on the other hand. Politicians for whom the fiscal rule credibly shuts down
any future deficit financing have to adjust their fiscal policies accordingly.
We analyze the extent to which a deficit rule induces compliance expectations of politi-
cians who are to be constrained by a numerical fiscal target. In addition, we analyze the
interaction between a rule’s credibility in the eyes of policy makers and the incentive to make
fiscal adjustments, where interactions are driven by initial conditions, fiscal shocks, as well
as personal and institutional determinants. We thereby contribute to the understanding of
the distinction between fiscal rule compliance on the one hand and induced fiscal outcomes
on the other hand. This distinction has recently been highlighted in empirical research by
Cordes et al. (2015).
Existing studies on the link between fiscal rules and fiscal decisions are only applicable
on a concurrent basis (through the use of real time data, see Beetsma and Guiliodori, 2010)
or ex-post (i.e. after years of experience with an existing rule; see references below). Our
survey method, by contrast, can be employed ex-ante and gives an early indication of the
rule’s potential effectiveness in the future before data on actual fiscal outcomes become
available. Finally, our approach opens the black box of aggregating heterogeneous preferences
and expectations of policy makers into fiscal decisions. We study the role of individual
characteristics in this aggregation process, such as political ideology, education, and political
experience.
To this end, we make use of the specific institutional context of the German debt brake, a
fiscal rule which was put into the constitution in 2009 and which restricts the budget deficit
of federal and state governments. We explore expectations for the members of all 16 German
state parliaments. This setting offers favorable conditions to study the link between state
politicians’ compliance expectations on the one hand and diverse initial fiscal conditions on
the other hand. Moreover, the German debt brake offers a rich dynamic setting which is
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characterized by lagged implementation: The rules’ binding constraints are phased in over
a longer period (for the state level by the year 2020, for the federal government already in
2016). Lagged implementation creates a dynamic decision problem for state parliamentarians
who have to decide on the extent and timing of consolidation efforts given substantial fiscal
uncertainties over the transition phase.
Our analysis of expectation formation comprises a theoretical and an empirical dimension.
Our theoretical model captures the key features of the lagged implementation of a deficit rule
and guides the empirical analysis. Decisions on deficits are dynamic by nature and imply a
trade-off between instant and future political costs from fiscal consolidation. A fiscal shock
occurring over the transition phase accounts for the fiscal uncertainties which characterize a
long transition period.
In the model, we analyze the impact of several, policy relevant factors. We show that
compliance is more likely i) the lower is the initial deficit, ii) the lower are bailout expecta-
tions, iii) the tighter is a fiscal rule in the near future (e.g. through additional state-specific
constraints), and iv) the higher is the first round deficit reduction. Furthermore, the model
predicts that insiders (defined to be members of parties of the incumbent government or
with-in-state parliamentarians) have more optimistic compliance expectations than outsiders
(opposition members, out-of-state politicians), when the overall compliance expectation is
low. Within the model we analyze two possible explanations, which lead to different testable
implications: asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders on the distribution of
the fiscal shock, and overconfidence on the side of insiders.
In our empirical analysis, we test the model predictions on the drivers of compliance
expectations based on a unique survey of members of all 16 German state parliaments. In
the survey we elicited responses for the politicians’ expectations on the own state complying
with the debt brake by the year 2020, on other states’ compliance, and on the likelihood of
sanctions or bailout if a state were to violate the new rule in 2020. Since the survey was
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non-anonymous, individual characteristics (such as education, party membership, etc.) and
state characteristics (such as future need for fiscal consolidation) can be used to systemat-
ically study the determinants of compliance expectations. We obtained answers from 639
politicians who provided their compliance expectations for 16 states, which leads to more
than 10,000 observations.
The survey not only shows that the German debt brake’s credibility among policy makers
is far from perfect. It also reveals that the heterogeneity of compliance expectations closely
corresponds to our theoretical predictions: states’ initial fiscal conditions, specific state fiscal
rules and bailout perceptions matter. In addition, there is a robust asymmetry in compliance
expectations between insiders and outsiders (both for in-state versus out-of-state politicians
and the government versus opposition dimension), when the overall compliance expectation
for a state is low. In that case, insiders tend to be significantly more optimistic than outsiders
regarding the likelihood of their state’s compliance. Based on the guidance of our theoretical
model we diagnose overconfidence of insiders (and not noisy information) as driving this
asymmetry. Overall, our analysis demonstrates that the credibility of a new national fiscal
rule can be strengthened through no-bailout rules, sustainable initial fiscal conditions, and
complementary sub-national rules.
Our specific credibility analysis is forward-looking and hence different from the extensive
literature which examines the impact of numerical fiscal rules based on aggregate past fiscal
performance. The standard approach is the estimation of cross-section or panel models for
the selected jurisdictions and their fiscal performance (see, e.g., for the US Poterba, 1996; for
Europe Debrun et al., 2008; for OECD countries Dahan and Strawczynski, 2010; and for Swiss
cantons Krogstrup and Wa¨lti, 2008; for a comprehensive meta-analysis on that literature see
Heinemann et al., 2016). Our theoretical contribution corresponds to a few recent papers
which analyze theoretically the role of fiscal rules in a political economy framework, such
as Azzimonti et al. (2016). Janeba (2012) considers the role of delay in making a German
15
type debt brake binding when the fiscal rule itself is credible. The incentives of bailouts
in a federal context are considered by Goodspeed (2002). Our survey approach and its
empirical implementation benefit from prior surveys of politicians that have been used in
recent research by two of the present authors. Heinemann and Janeba (2011) use a survey of
members of Germany’s national parliament to study ideological bias in tax policy. Janeba
and Osterloh (2013) use a survey of mayors in Germany to empirically motivate the spatial
structure of local tax competition in a theoretical tax competition model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets up the theoretical model and
derives comparative statics for the likelihood of compliance with the debt brake. Section 2.3
describes our original survey and provides background information on Germany’s political
and fiscal system and the debt brake. Our empirical findings are presented and discussed in
section 2.4. Finally, section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 A model of fiscal rule compliance
We model the dynamic fiscal decision of an incumbent government to reduce its deficit in
order to meet the target of a fiscal rule becoming effective only in the future. Deficit shocks
make compliance non-trivial and uncertain. Specifically, we assume that the economy lasts
for three periods, t = 0, 1, 2, where period 0 is the past, period 1 is the near future when a
fiscal shock occurs, and period 2 is the distant future when the fiscal rule becomes binding
(i.e., 2020 in the context of the German debt brake). There are two key budgetary decisions
to be taken at the beginning of periods 1 and 2. The admittedly simple structure is sufficient
to capture the uncertainty about compliance with the debt brake and allows us to derive
hypotheses for our empirical analysis.
The main variable of interest is the government deficit dt. The initial deficit d0 > 0 is
exogenous from the viewpoint of the incumbent government in period 1. The fiscal rule
requires the government to run (at least) a balanced budget in period 2. If this target is
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met, that is, d2 ≤ 0, the government obtains (gross) payoff u, which excludes the cost of
fiscal adjustment. Otherwise the government is noncompliant and obtains payoff bu, where
b is an endogenous variable that reflects the degree of non-compliance and is discussed in
more detail below. The difference between u and bu comprises, inter alia, a reputation effect.
Policy makers across party lines have high regard for the debt brake, which may reflect the
importance of the rule of law in Germany.6 Violating the constitution is likely to be costly
for a state government in terms of reputation and possible consequences.7 The term bu may
also capture a possible bailout when the government does not comply, which we discuss in
detail below.
The government can reach the balanced budget in two steps by reducing the deficit in
periods 1 and 2 by the amounts r1 and r2, respectively, which could be negative. We model
deficit reduction in a reduced form without specifying the nature of the fiscal adjustment
(i.e., tax increases and/or expenditure cuts). Deficit reduction (increase) is costly (beneficial)
for the government in the period when it takes place because government approval ratings
or reelection chances are harmed (improved). We focus on the concurrent cost even though
the cost of permanent deficit reduction may spill over to future periods. The cost function
for permanently reducing the deficit by r is c(r) in the period when the adjustment is made,
and has the properties c(r) R 0 for r R 0, and c′ > 0, c′′ > 0. Strict convexity implies that
spreading a given deficit reduction over time is efficient. This assumption seems reasonable
given the long time horizon until the debt brake becomes binding for German states and
given the high initial deficits in some states at the time of the rule’s introduction of the debt
brake 2009.
6 In line with this assumption is the fact that German states typically advertise publicly their efforts on
the way to complying with the debt brake.
7 One might wonder why states agreed to the debt brake in the first place. Two reasons seem to be
relevant: First, policymakers who agreed to the debt brake in 2009 are not necessarily in power when
the balanced budget requirement becomes binding in 2020. Second, five economically and fiscally weaker
states obtain annual transfers until 2019 which made agreement more attractive. See also section 2.3.1
for more details.
17
The actual deficit in period 1 is a function of the initial deficit d0, the reduction r1
undertaken at the beginning of period 1, and a shock s ∈ [s, s] that occurs during period 1:
d1 = d0 − r1 + s. (2.1)
In period 2, after observing the realized value of d1, the government sets the deficit for period
2 by choosing r2 so that
d2 = d1 − r2. (2.2)
By assumption no shock takes place in period 2. The government payoff at the beginning of
period 1 is given by
U = −c(r1) + δ[v − c(r2)], (2.3)
where v = u when the government is compliant in period 2, that is d2 ≤ 0, and v = bu when
not. Let δ ≤ 1 be the discount factor.
2.2.1 Solving the model
We analyze the conditions under which it is in the government’s interest (not) to comply
with the fiscal target. For the time being we focus on the political decision maker. Later we
consider how other individuals (such as opposition politicians or politicians from outside of
state) assess the likelihood of compliance. The model is solved from the back.
Period 2
As shown in (2.1), the value of r2 that is necessary to meet the fiscal target is the result
of the deficit reduction effort in period 1, the fiscal shock and the initial deficit. On the one
hand, the government may choose to comply and selects r2 = d1 = d0− r1 + s, which implies
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d2 = 0. There is no benefit from over-achieving the fiscal target because deficit reduction is
costly. Knowing the value of s, the period 2 payoff for compliance is
Uc = u− c(d0 − r1 + s). (2.4)
If, on the other hand, the government does not comply with the fiscal rule its net payoff, after
taking fiscal policy choices into account, is b(r2)u−c(r2). We assume that the degree of non-
compliance, captured by the function b(r2), matters. Deviations are costly in terms of public
reputation. While small deviations may be interpreted by the public as bad luck or inaccurate
measurement, large deviations are likely to be blamed on policy makers. Specifically, we
assume that the function b(r2) is increasing and strictly concave: b
′(r2) > 0 > b′′(r2).
Whether compliance or non-compliance is optimal depends on the net utility of each
option after taking fiscal policy choices into account. The optimal level of fiscal consolidation
(possibly negative) when not complying is found by maximizing the payoff with respect to
r2. The first order condition reads b
′(r2)u−c′(r2) = 0. The second order condition is fulfilled
by assumption on the properties of functions b(r2) and c(r). Denote the optimal choice by
r∗2nc. Assuming that this level is indeed not sufficient to be compliant with the target (i.e.,
r∗2nc < d0 − r0 + s), the (period 2) net benefit from optimal non-compliance is
Unc = b(r
∗
2nc)u− c(r∗2nc). (2.5)
A comparison of (2.4) and (2.5) reveals that compliance is preferable to non-compliance if
and only if Uc ≥ Unc, which is equivalent to
c(d1) ≤ ∆u := u− Unc = (1− b(r∗2nc))u+ c(r∗2nc), (2.6)
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that is, the cost of reducing the deficit to zero under compliance is not higher than the gain
from compliance measured by ∆u. Condition (2.6) shows that b(r∗2nc) < 1 is a necessary
condition for compliance to occur because c(d1) > c(r
∗
2nc). In short, the reputation loss
under noncompliance must be sufficiently strong. We make this assumption which seems
reasonable in the German context: Even fiscally weak states make some efforts to reach
the balanced budget target in 2020 (Detemple et al., 2015) and politicians agree on the
desirability of the debt brake .
The cost of deficit reduction c(r) is a monotone function of r. In addition Unc is indepen-
dent of d0, r1 and s. We can therefore invert (2.6) when it holds with equality, and define
a critical level of the period 1 deficit for compliance to occur, namely, d∗1 = c
−1(∆u). For
d1 less than or equal to d
∗
1, the government chooses to be compliant, otherwise not. Using
(2.1), the threshold level defines implicitly a maximum level of the deficit shock s, called s∗,
that is consistent with d2 = 0:
s∗ = d∗1 + r1 − d0 = c−1(∆u) + r1 − d0. (2.7)
Instead of stating government compliance in terms of the period 1 deficit (d∗1), condition
(2.7) allows us to restate the condition in terms of the realized value of the shock s: For
s ≤ s∗ the government is compliant, otherwise not. The threshold level s∗ = s(r1,∆u, d0)
is a positive function of the additional gain from compliance and the deficit reduction in
period 1, but depends negatively on the initial deficit d0. Recall that r1 is exogenous from
the viewpoint of period 2, but endogenous ex-ante.
The stochastic nature of the government deficit in period 1 makes compliance uncertain.
We capture this aspect in the probability of compliance p, viewed from the time before the
shock realizes (but after r1 was chosen). We are interested in the relationship between p
and exogenous parameters of the model, such as the initial deficit d0, the gross gain from
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compliance ∆u, possible bailout expectations, as well as an additional fiscal rule restricting
the maximum deficit level in period 1.
In order to state the probability of compliance and to obtain closed-form solutions we
assume that the shock s is drawn from a uniform distribution with support [s, s] and prob-
ability density S−1 = (s − s)−1. When s∗ ∈ [s, s], the probability of compliance with the
fiscal rule, prior to the fiscal shock, is given by
p = p(d0, r1,∆u, s, s) =
s∗ − s
s− s =
c−1(∆u) + r1 − d0 − s
S
(2.8)
The probability p depends on (r1,∆u, d0) and lies between 0 and 1 under suitable assumptions
on the size of d0 and S.
8 We make those assumptions, as this leads to an empirically relevant
setup. The probability p increases (decreases) with the level of period 1 deficit reduction
(initial deficit), and the gross gain from compliance:9
∂p
∂r1
= − ∂p
∂d0
=
1
S
> 0,
∂p
∂(∆u)
=
c−1
′
(∆u)
S
> 0. (2.9)
Period 1
At the beginning of period 1 the government chooses r1 and affects the probability of com-
pliance via (2.8). The expected government payoff is
E[U ] = −c(r1) + δ
S
[∫ s∗
s
(u− c(d0 − r1 + s)) ds+
∫ s
s∗
Unc ds
]
= −c(r1) + δ
[
Unc + p∆u− 1
S
∫ s∗
s
c(d0 − r1 + s) ds
]
(2.10)
8 First, the probability is strictly positive if s∗ > s, which for given r0 holds if d0 and s are relatively
small. The probability of compliance is less than one when s∗ < s, which holds for relatively high values
of the initial deficit d0 and maximum shock s.
9 The sign of the results shown in (2.9) do not depend on assuming a uniform density function for the
fiscal shock s. Moreover, for any continuous density function, the government payoff function looks
almost identical to (2.10), except for the fact that now the probability density would enter the integral
on the right hand side, which makes the subsequent comparative static analysis more difficult.
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The first line shows in square brackets the utility (periods 1 and 2) under compliance and
non-compliance, respectively. For low levels of s, s ≤ s∗, the government complies in period
2 by choosing a level of deficit reduction that leads to d2 = 0 (the first integral). For high
realizations of s, s ≥ s∗, the government does not comply (the second integral). Rewriting
terms, the second line in (2.10) displays in square brackets the same expression as before,
now as the sum of the guaranteed utility under non-compliance and the expected gross gain
from compliance, minus the cost of deficit reduction in period 2 when s is sufficiently small
(s ≤ s∗).
First period deficit reduction r1 affects (2.10) via the cost of effort in period 1 (the first
term in (2.10)), the probability of realizing the gross gain of compliance p, and the cost of
effort in period 2 under compliance. Recall that the threshold level s∗ is a function of r1.
The first order condition with respect to r1 is
∂E[U ]
∂r1
= −c′(r1) + δ
[
∆u
dp
dr1
− 1
S
∫ s∗
s
dc(d0 − r1 + s)
dr1
ds− 1
S
c(d0 − r1 + s∗)ds
∗
dr1
]
= −c′(r1) + δ
[
∆u− c(d0 − r1 + s)
S
]
= 0.10 (2.11)
Condition (2.11) has the following interpretation: An increase in r1 increases the marginal
cost of deficit reduction in the current period. The marginal benefit of doing so is the
discounted increase in the expected gross gain of compliance (due to the increase in the
probability of compliance) adjusted for the cost of eliminating the remaining deficit d0−r1+s.
Recall that S−1 represents the increase in the probability of compliance when r1 is raised
marginally. We denote by rˆ1 the optimal level of deficit reduction in period 1.
10 Solutions to (2.11) may indicate maxima or minima depending on the sign of the second-order condition
−c′′(r1) + δc
′(d0−r1+s)
S . We use techniques from the theory of monotone comparative statics to sign
comparative statics effects.
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2.2.2 Comparative statics and hypotheses
We now study the determinants of the probability of compliance p from the perspective of
period 0, which depends on exogenous model parameters both directly, as shown in (2.8),
but also indirectly via the optimal level of initial deficit reduction r1, as implicitly defined in
(2.11). We use insights from the theory of monotone comparative statics to sign the effects
(see van Zandt, 2002).11
1. Initial deficit: We first analyze the effect of a change in the initial deficit d0 on period
1 deficit reduction. Based on Remark 5 and Theorem 4 in van Zandt (2002), the expected
payoff function (2.10) has the property of strictly decreasing differences in (r1, d0)
∂2E[U(r1, d0)]
∂r1∂d0
= −δc
′(d0 − r1 + s)
S
< 0. (2.12)
Theorem 1 in van Zandt (2002) implies that an increase in the initial deficit lowers deficit
reduction in period 1, that is ∂rˆ1
∂d0
< 0. The probability of compliance p (see (2.8)) is also
lowered by the direct effect so that the total effect becomes
∂p
∂d0
=
1
S
(
∂rˆ1
∂d0
− 1
)
< 0. (2.13)
States with a larger initial deficit are less likely to comply with the fiscal rule in period 2
(Hypothesis 1: H1).
2. Bailout expectations: Up to now we did not explicitly address the role of a possible
bailout. Suppose a bailout is possible, and consider an increase in the exogenous probability
of a bailout. Formally, we capture the bailout probability by interpreting the utility from
non-compliance bu as expected utility, which comprises the utility if no bailout occurs and if
11 Alternatively, assuming that the second order conditions hold for maximization of (2.10), we obtain the
same comparative static results.
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it does occur. An increase in the bailout probability (for any given level of fiscal adjustment
r2) leads to a higher level of bu, a higher net utility Unc (the indirect effect on optimal deficit
reduction in period 1, r∗1nc, can be ignored as a result of the envelope theorem), and thus
lower net utility gain ∆u. Looking again at the cross partial derivative of (2.10)
∂2E[U(r1,∆u)]
∂r1∂(∆u)
=
δ
S
> 0, (2.14)
the expected payoff function has the property of strictly increasing differences in (rr,∆u).
An increase in ∆u, which is equivalent to a lower bailout probability, leads to an increase in
period 0 deficit reduction
rˆ1
∂(∆u)
> 0. (2.15)
Moreover, a lower bailout utility increases the probability of compliance because an increase
in ∆u raises p both directly and indirectly:
∂p
∂(∆u)
=
1
S
(
c−1
′
(∆u) +
∂rˆ1
∂(∆u)
)
> 0. (2.16)
Higher bailout expectations (= smaller ∆u) make compliance with the balanced budget re-
quirement less likely (Hypothesis 2: H2).
3. State fiscal rule in period 1: Some states in Germany have introduced own fiscal rules
which constrain fiscal policy prior to 2020. The state rules are often supposed to strengthen
the national debt brake. We capture this aspect by allowing for an additional fiscal rule to
be already effective in period 1. We assume that the additional fiscal rule is credible, perhaps
because there is no one to bail out the government within its state. Yet the fiscal rule may
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be of different strictness, which we express in terms of the maximum deficit that is allowed
in period 1, d0 + s. The upper limit of the deficit in period 1 must obey
d1 ≤ d1 = α(d0 + s). (2.17)
The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] represents the strength of the fiscal rule. Lower values of α
correspond to a tighter fiscal rule in period 1. Using (2.2) we can reformulate the requirement
in (2.17) in terms of initial deficit reduction:
r1 ≥ (1− α)(d0 + s) =: r1. (2.18)
A tighter fiscal rule in period 1 requires a (weakly) higher deficit reduction effort in period 1
(r1 is decreasing in α). Whether the additional fiscal rule has bite depends on the magnitudes
of r1 and rˆ1, where the latter is the solution to (2.11) and represents the optimal choice of
initial deficit reduction in the absence of the additional fiscal rule in period 1. When r1 > rˆ1,
the new fiscal rule is binding. This result has further ramifications for the probability
of compliance with the original fiscal rule in period 2. When the state rule is binding,
compliance with the debt brake is more likely because probability p depends positively on
r1.
The likelihood of compliance (weakly) increases in the strength of a credible fiscal rule at state
level which restricts the period 1 deficit (Hypothesis 3: H3).
4. Individual Beliefs: Consider the (interim) belief in government compliance during pe-
riod 1 (before s is realized, but after r1 is chosen). We wish to compare the beliefs in
compliance of two types of politicians: the incumbent government or in-state legislators on
the one hand (the “insiders”), and opposition politicians or out-of-state politicians on the
other hand (the “outsiders”).
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The psychological literature (see Moore and Healy, 2008) suggests that a large number of
individuals (more than half) believe to perform better than the median which is impossible.
In the present context, we model overconfidence as follows: Insiders believe the range of fiscal
shocks to be more favorable than outsiders, perhaps due to their self-perceived competency
in managing the economy. To capture this, we define the upper and lower bound of the fiscal
shock as
s = smax − γ and s = smin − γ (2.19)
where smax and smin are the base values of the maximal and minimal shock. A higher value
of γ means that the distribution of the fiscal shock shifts lower, leading to a smaller expected
value of the shock E[s] = s
max−smin−2γ
2
, but unchanged variance V ar[s] = (s
max−smin)2
12
. The
inverse density S = s− s = smax − smin is independent of γ.
If incumbent governments or in-state politicians are overconfident, they believe in a higher
value of γ than outsiders. We can derive the implications for the probability of compliance
by inserting (2.19) into (2.8), then differentiate to find (for given r1)
∂p
∂γ
=
1
S
> 0. (2.20)
Hence at an interim stage in period 1 insiders believe in a higher probability of compliance
than outsiders. This effect is reinforced if we consider the ex-ante perspective when r1
is chosen. The effect of γ on period 1 deficit reduction can be signed by looking at the
cross-partial derivative to (2.10)
∂2E[U(r1, γ)]
∂r1∂γ
=
δc′(d0 − r1 + smin − γ)
S
> 0. (2.21)
Hence a higher value of γ makes it more attractive to reduce the deficit in period 1, which in
turn increases the probability of compliance even further, an interesting aspect we return to
26
in the concluding section. Overconfident insiders believe more strongly in compliance than
outsiders.
Alternatively, we may assume that insiders have more precise information about the
range of fiscal shocks than outsiders. Let us assume that the fiscal shock is bounded by
s = smax + σ and s = smin − σ. (2.22)
In this case variations in σ leave the expected value of the fiscal shock E[s] = s
max−smin
2
unaffected, while the variance increases in the parameter σ. Note that S = s − s = smax −
smin + 2σ is a function of the shift parameter σ. We assume that outsiders have a noisier
signal about the range of the fiscal shock, and thus a larger value of σ. Inserting (2.22) into
p and differentiating with respect to σ gives
dp
dσ
=
1− 2p
s− s . (2.23)
Condition (2.23) allows us to rank the beliefs of insiders and outsiders: If insiders believe
in compliance with more than 50% probability, pins > 0.5, then outsiders attach a lower
probability (pout < pins). If, on the other hand, insiders find compliance less likely than
non-compliance (pins < 0.5), outsiders are more optimistic than insiders, that is pout > pins.
In other words, insiders have more extreme views than outsiders when the latter have noisier
information than the former.
Combining the insights from the two alternative setups we formulate our fourth hypoth-
esis:
Insiders (the incumbent government or in-state politicians) are more optimistic about
the probability of compliance than outsiders (political opposition or out-of-state politicians)
if insiders are either overconfident or if under the noisy information hypothesis insiders
consider compliance with the fiscal rule more likely than non-compliance. Insiders are less
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optimistic about compliance than outsiders only under the noisy information hypothesis and
if insiders believe compliance is less likely than non-compliance. (Hypothesis 4: H4). It is
the latter case which allows us to distinguish the two alternative hypotheses empirically.
Looking at states with on average low expectations regarding compliance, the finding that
insiders are more optimistic than outsiders favors the overconfidence explanation.
2.3 Institutional and survey details
2.3.1 Germany’s federal system and the constitutional debt brake
Before we introduce the survey we provide a brief introduction to Germany’s electoral,
political and fiscal system (for a more detailed description of the German party and electoral
system the reader is referred to Roberts, 1988; Poguntke, 1994).
Democracy. Germany is a parliamentary democracy with two chambers at the federal
level: the lower chamber called Bundestag, which is elected by all citizens, and the upper
chamber called Bundesrat, which represents the 16 German states. The debt brake was
approved in 2009 by more than the 2/3 required majority in both chambers in order to
change the constitution. At the state level, there exists only one chamber like the lower
chamber at the federal level. We surveyed members of these state parliaments, called MSP
henceforth.
Fiscal Federalism. The German state features three government layers with partly over-
lapping areas of policy responsibility: (1) the federal level, (2) the states, and (3) the mu-
nicipal level. Tax autonomy at the state level is relatively low. Revenues are equalized
to a significant degree across states and in addition through vertical tax sharing. Differ-
ences in state revenues per capita are reduced via a fiscal equalization system. Through the
large degree of revenue sharing the German federal system is closer to being an example of
cooperative fiscal federalism rather than competitive federalism (Braun, 2007).
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Fiscal Rules. The fiscal rule is the German debt brake (“Schuldenbremse”), which became
part of the German constitution (“Grundgesetz”) in 2009. The new constitutional rule
requires the federal government to run a (cyclically adjusted) budget deficit of no more than
0.35% of GDP starting in 2016 (see Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2009, for a detailed
description). For German states (“La¨nder”) the new rule is more stringent and requires
them to run a (cyclically adjusted) zero deficit from 2020 onwards. For the states, no
specific path of deficit reduction is defined. However, five states (Berlin, Bremen, Saarland,
Saxony-Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein) receive “consolidation aids” in total of e800 million
annually until 2019. In return they are required to reduce their 2010 budget deficit in equal
steps until 2020. As a reaction to the new national constitutional rule, several states have
introduced own rules echoing or even sharpening the national rule (for a survey see Ciaglia
and Heinemann, 2013).
Enforcement . The Stability Council (“Stabilita¨tsrat”) has the task to detect budgetary
emergencies at the federal and state level and check compliance with the Fiscal Compact. It
represents the federal ministers of finance and economics as well as all state finance ministers.
The Council is not allowed to impose monetary sanctions directly. In the case of the five
states receiving consolidation aids, the Council is entitled to withhold aids in case of non-
compliance. Non-monetary sanctions for all states originate from the possible publicity of
the Stability Council’s statements or from political costs materializing if a state budget is
ruled as unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court.
Economic Performance. Fiscal and economic situations of states are highly diverse (Table
2.1): GDP per capita in Hamburg, for example, is more than twice as large as in most
eastern states. Debt to state GDP is particularly high for the city states of Berlin and
Bremen (both above 60%). Often high debt levels go hand in hand with large projected
fiscal adjustments, as identified by the German Council of Economic Advisors’ calculation of
consolidation need. One explanation for the nevertheless fairly positive credit ratings is that
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bailout expectations exist. The last column of Table 2.1 provides an index for the stringency
of individual states’ fiscal rules (Ciaglia and Heinemann, 2013), which takes account of the
rule’s contents, precision, legal basis and enforcement.
Table 2.1: Economic and fiscal indicators
Population
2011 (in
millions)
GDP per
capita
2011 (in
thousands
of e)
Total
debt to
GDP
ratio 2011
(in %)
Need for
Consoli-
dation
2011-2020
(in % of
GDP)
Bond
Rating
2012a
Index of
stringency
of state
debt rule
Federal
Government
81.84 44.02 49.79e - AAAd,e
Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg
10.79 34.89 17.16 0.10 AAAd 0.62
Bavaria 12.60 35.44 6.79 -0.60 AAAd 0.48
Berlin 3.50 28.95 61.64 3.50 Aa1c 0.65
Brandenburg 2.50 22.08 35.77 2.10 Aa1c 0.51
Bremen 0.66 42.39 73.63 3.40 - 0.64
Hamburg 1.80 52.49 26.86 0.30 - 0.47
Hesse 6.09 37.51 17.28 1.30 AAd 0.50
Mecklenburg-West
Pomerania
1.63 21.40 29.11 1.70 - 0.46
Lower Saxony 7.91 28.35 25.42 1.30 - 0.55
North
Rhine-Westphalia
17.84 31.88 33.22 1.60 AA-d 0.45
Rhineland-
Palatinate
4.00 28.31 32.49 1.80 AAAb 0.69
Saarland 1.01 30.10 41.83 2.80 - 0.70
Saxony 4.14 22.98 9.99 0.60 AAAd 0.76
Saxony-Anhalt 2.31 22.43 39.84 2.50 AA+d 0.77
Schleswig-Holstein 2.84 25.95 38.57 1.30 AAAb 0.77
Thuringia 2.22 21.66 35.04 2.30 AAAb 0.66
Notes: a from http://www.welt.de/finanzen/article107267058/Bundeslaender-profitieren-von-
Deutschland-Bonds.html last access on 23 July 2013; b Fitch; c Moody’s; d S&P, e referring
to federal level alone, not to the aggregate of Germany. Need for consolidation is taken from
Sachversta¨ndigenrat (2011) and is based on the average budget deficits from 2007 to 2010. It indicates
the extent of consolidation necessary to comply with the debt brake by 2020. For that purpose, it
takes account of pension obligations and the reduction of transfers from the federal level (Special
Purpose Grants) which will both come into effect until 2020. The index of stringency of the debt rule
is normalized between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate a more stringent debt rule (Ciaglia and
Heinemann, 2013).
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2.3.2 The survey among members of state parliaments
Our survey was sent to all 1861 members of the 16 German state parliaments during a
period of 14 months in 2011 and 2012. Surveys were conducted approximately at mid-
term of an electoral cycle. 639 politicians participated in the survey which resulted in a
response rate of 34%. This is a reasonably high rate compared to other surveys among
members of parliaments with response rates between 20 and 30% in most cases (for regional
parliaments see Andre´ et al., 2014; for national parliaments see Andre´ et al., 2015). Response
rates differ along state and party affiliation (Table 2.2). Possible concerns about the effect of
different response rates are dealt with in the econometric analysis below. The survey was non-
Table 2.2: Response rates and survey waves
Number
of MSPs
Number
of
responses
Response
rate
Survey
wavea
Last state
election
before
survey
Overall 1861 639 34.34%
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 138 77 55.80% 3 3/2011
Bavaria 187 75 40.11% 1 9/2008
Berlin 149 30 20.13% 3 9/2011
Brandenburg 88 19 21.59% 1 9/2009
Bremen 83 18 21.69% 3 5/2011
Hamburg 124 39 31.45% 2 2/2011
Hesse 114 50 43.86% 2 1/2009
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 71 17 23.94% 3 9/2011
Lower Saxony 152 54 35.53% 1 1/2008
North Rhine-Westphalia 181 51 28.18% 2 5/2010
Rhineland-Palatinate 101 50 49.50% 3 3/2011
Saarland 51 20 39.22% 1 8/2009
Saxony 133 45 33.83% 2 8/2009
Saxony-Anhalt 106 47 44.79% 2 3/2011
Schleswig-Holstein 95 29 30.53% 1 9/2009
Thuringia 88 36 40.91% 1 8/2009
Notes: a The first wave (1) took place in March and April 2011, the second wave (2) took place in
December 2011 and January 2012, and the third wave (3) took place in April and May 2012.
anonymous, and we are able to match the survey responses with personal characteristics such
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as education, committee membership, etc. from public sources and with state characteristics
such as GDP per capita, debt, need for fiscal consolidation, etc. (see Table A.1 in the
appendix for all variables).
Non-anonymity of responses could lead to untruthful replies. Parliamentarians might be
concerned about their perceived loyalty to the own state or official party lines. Fiscal pref-
erences could impact on expectations through a self-serving bias. However, both the survey
design and the empirical analysis below substantially reduce the potential resulting bias.
In the conduct of our survey, we explicitly guarantee confidential treatment of individual
responses. Insofar as the parliamentarians trust this assurance they do not expect that any
individual statements become public. In this respect, our confidential survey approach is su-
perior to studies which exploit recorded votes with their unavoidable publicity. Moreover, in
the econometric analysis below we take further precautions and explicitly control for several
individual characteristics which could drive incentives to hide true expectations (including
proxies on debt preferences and the role in government or opposition).
The questionnaire consisted of eight questions covering preferences for revenue autonomy
and fiscal equalization, spending preferences as well as questions related to the debt brake
(for a full description see Heinemann et al., 2014, in Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik).
For our study, we focus on the following two questions:
Question to compliance expectation: Which of the 16 German states will comply with
the constitutional debt brake as of 2020 with high probability?
Each of the 16 states could be ticked individually or options “all” or “none” could be chosen.
In a second question, we also asked for the consequences of non-compliance:
Question to consequences of non-compliance: What will happen if German states do
not comply with the constitutional debt brake as of 2020? (multiple answers possible)
• Constitutional courts (on state and federal levels) will enforce budget consolidation
• The constitution will be changed so as to relax the debt brake
• Transfer payments to non-complying states are given, which help to lower the deficit
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• There will be sanctions against non-complying states, e.g., lower transfers within the fed-
eral fiscal equalization scheme
• There will be ordinary legal or constitutional interventions in non-complying states’ bud-
get autonomy
• Merger of states
• Nothing will happen
• Other:
Figure 2.1: Expected compliance - average answers with equal weights across states
BB=Brandenburg, BE=Berlin, BW=Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, BY=Bavaria, HB=Bremen, HE=Hesse,
HH=Hamburg, MV=Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, NI=Lower Saxony, NW= North Rhine-
Westphalia, RP=Rhineland-Palatinate, SH=Schleswig-Holstein, SL=Saarland, SN=Saxony,
ST=Saxony-Anhalt, TH=Thuringia
Figure 2.1 indicates that the deficit rule’s credibility is imperfect and compliance expec-
tations differ remarkably for different states. While Bavaria is seen as an almost certain case
of compliance the prospects of the city states of Bremen and Berlin are highly pessimistic.
These expectations obviously correlate closely with current consolidation needs and debt lev-
els (see Table 2.1). Note again that expectations for a particular state i come from legislators
in state i and legislators from all other fifteen states j 6= i. In addition, a strong asymmetry
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emerges for insider/outsider expectations on financially weak states (see Figure 2.2): While
MSPs from other states are highly skeptical, a large majority of politicians from economically
weaker states expect their state to respect the debt brake’s zero deficit cap by the year 2020
(see Table A.2 in the appendix for full information on cross-state expectations).
Figure 2.2: Mean assessment of insiders vs. mean assessment of outsiders
State acronyms: See Figure 2.1.
Note: the mean assessment of outsiders is the average answer of outsiders with equal weights across
the respective 15 other states (see line “φ15otherstates” in Table A.2 in the appendix)
Figure 2.3 summarizes the results for the non-compliance question: A significant num-
ber of politicians expects a strong role of constitutional courts to enforce consolidation or
sanction. However, a large fraction of politicians expect the government budget constraint
to be soft due to bailout-transfers or a relaxation of the strict debt brake. Overall, these
descriptive findings point to the possible relevance of our model’s prediction on the role of
the initial fiscal situation, bailout expectations or the expected asymmetry between insiders
and outsiders. We substantiate the model’s explanatory power in the subsequent regression
analysis.
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Figure 2.3: Expected consequences of non-compliance - multiple answers possible
2.4 Regression analyses
Our theoretical model predicts that compliance expectations of politicians should be related
to the initial deficit, or more general, the initial economic and fiscal conditions of the state in
question (H1), the individual politician’s bailout expectations (H2), the existence and char-
acteristics of state rules which complement the national debt brake (H3), and the individual
politician’s insider/outsider status (due to either asymmetric information or overconfidence
on the side of insiders, H4). We cover these four dimensions as follows (for precise variable
information see Table A.1 in the appendix):
• The state characteristics include GDP per capita and the initial budgetary position, i.e.
the average budget deficit over the last three years prior to the survey. To test for the
robustness of results we replace the average budget deficit by the need for consolidation
or total debt to GDP, respectively. The need for consolidation is taken from the German
35
Council of Economic Advisors (Sachversta¨ndigenrat, 2011) and reflects the extent to which
states need to consolidate their budgets until 2020 when the debt brake comes into effect.
• For bailout-expectations (H2) we exploit the survey question on the expected consequences
of non-compliance (Figure 2.3). From this question we construct an index which captures
the individual perception of the strength of the budget constraint. A larger indicator value
represents the perception of a stricter budget constraint and lower bailout-expectations.12
• For the existence and stringency of a state rule (H3) we use the indicator of Ciaglia and
Heinemann (2013) as presented in Table 2.1.
• The insider-outsider-differentiation (H4) has two dimensions: First, we can distinguish
between incumbents as insiders and all others, where “incumbents” are defined as members
of one of the governing parties in the respective state. Second, we can compare the
expectations for a specific state’s compliance between in-state and out-of-state legislators.
We include both dimensions in our testing.
We enrich this theory-guided choice of variables through the inclusion of further individual
and state controls. A growing empirical literature points to the importance of these variables
for economic, monetary and fiscal performance (Besley et al., 2011; Go¨hlmann and Vaubel,
2007; Moessinger, 2014). We take account of the politician’s gender, age, education (tertiary
degree, type of degree, such as in business/economics), role in parliament (membership in
budget committee) and experience (number of years in parliament). To control for a potential
self-serving bias or expressive preferences – meaning that respondents might answer what
they would like to be true – we include the answers to two more questions from our survey as
12 Indicator construction is as follows: We add one point if a politician expects one of the “tough” reactions
to a state non-complying (i.e. “enforcement through constitutional courts”, “sanctions”, “intervention
in budget autonomy” or “merger of states”) and subtract one point for each of these reactions which
is not expected. Analogously, we subtract one point for each of the expected “soft” reactions to a
state-non complying (i.e. “change of constitution”, “transfers” or “nothing”) and add one point for
each of these reaction which is not expected.
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controls. First, we use a politician’s view on the (unconditional) desirability of her own state’s
compliance.13 Second, we account for each politician’s preference for fiscal consolidation.14
Additionally, we add party dummies to allow for the impact of ideology which might
influence expectations since perceptions of economic constraints can be biased by strong ide-
ological positions (see, e.g., Heinemann and Janeba, 2011, for the perception of globalization
constraints on tax policy).
Among state controls we include a dummy for those states receiving consolidation aid
and the extent of fiscal equalization transfers received. These variables cover transfer depen-
dency. Finally, we add a dummy for the political orientation of the incumbent government
which allows for the possibility that the incumbent’s political orientation has an impact on
compliance expectations for the respective state.
2.4.1 Baseline results
We estimate a probit model with the compliance expectation as dependent variable (dummy
equals 1: Politician expects a state to comply with the debt brake as of 2020; 0: expect a state
not to comply). Since we have expectations of 639 politicians on 16 states we can exploit
a total of up to 10,224 observations depending on the specification. We cluster standard
errors for state pairs. Column (1) in Table 2.3 summarizes our starting point with the full
set of control variables. We include fixed effects for MSPs’ states of origin to account for the
possibility that politicians of particular states may be more or less optimistic in general.
All proxies related to our four hypotheses are highly significant. Signs are in line with the
theoretical expectations for the H1-, H2- and H3-related indicators: Compliance expectations
13 Survey Question: “In 2020, how desirable is it for your Bundesland to comply with the constitutional
debt brake?” Answers given on discrete nine point scale ranging from -4 (completely undesirable) to
+4 (very desirable).
14 Survey Question: “Assume that your state’s budget exhibits a permanent surplus (after business cycle
adjustment). How would you use this surplus?” Answer given by distributing a hypothetical 100e
surplus to different budgetary items such as “higher expenses”, “lesser taxes and fees” and “repayment
of legacy debt”. Here, we use the relative amount allotted to “repayment of legacy debt”, which leaves
us with a variable ranging from 0 to 100.
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for states with unfavorable starting positions (lower GDP per capita or larger deficits) are
less optimistic. The belief in bailout-transfers or other relaxations of the fiscal rule (lower
index for strength of budget constraint) lowers compliance expectations. A stricter state-
specific fiscal rule is correlated with a more favorable view for this particular state. Judged
on the basis of average marginal effects, the size of the effects is substantial: A one percentage
point higher initial average deficit (H1) lowers the probability that this state is expected to
be compliant by about 9 percentage points on average. The difference between a very soft
(-7) and very hard (+7) perception of the budget constraint (H2) amounts to an impact of
18 percentage points. And the difference between the weakest (0.45) and strongest (0.78)
observable state debt rule (H3) is associated with a probability increase of 24 percentage
points that a state is predicted to comply.
H4-related proxies are highly significant for both insider-outsider-dimensions: Insiders
(members of a state’s governing parties/in-state-MSPs) are more optimistic than outsiders
(members of opposition parties/out-of-state-MSPs). The size of the effect is much larger for
the in-state vs. out-of-state-dimension (21-22 percentage points) than for the government-
opposition-distinction (6 percentage points).
Our theoretical analysis suggests, however, that the existence of more optimistic insiders
could be due to overconfidence or noisy information. For a distinction, we deepen our econo-
metric analysis by splitting the sample on the basis of compliance expectations of insiders
(Table 2.4).15 Specifically, we approximate the theory-based probability of compliance of in-
siders (pins) by the average compliance expectation of own-state-politicians, as recorded on
the diagonal of Table A.2 in the appendix. We follow our theoretical model by splitting the
sample into states with pins < 0.5 and states with pins > 0.5. Doing this, we end up with one
smaller sample of five “pessimistic” states (see column (1) of Table 2.4) and a larger sample
15 We have to use sample splits because we cannot estimate interaction effects reliably due to the non-
linearity of the probit model used.
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Table 2.3: Likelihood of state’s compliance - baseline results
(1) (2)
Independent Variables Baseline 1 Average
marginal effects
Baseline 2 Average
marginal effects
Individual: education
Tertiary degree 0.006 0.002
[0.036] [0.010]
Economics/Business degree 0.023 0.006
[0.037] [0.010]
Individual: parliamentary role
Member of governing parties in state (H4) 0.207*** 0.056***
[0.046] [0.012]
Member of budget committee -0.162*** -0.044***
[0.039] [0.010]
Number of years in parliament -0.006** -0.002**
[0.002] [0.001]
Individual: other demographic variables
Female -0.111*** -0.030***
[0.032] [0.009]
Age in years 0.002 0.001
[0.001] [0.000]
Individual: preferences and bailout-expectation
Desirability of own state’s unconditional compliance 0.066*** 0.018***
[0.010] [0.003]
Preference for fiscal consolidation (debt reduction) 0.004*** 0.001***
[0.001] [0.000]
Index for perceived strength of budget constraint (H2) 0.046*** 0.012***
[0.005] [0.001]
Individual: party affiliationa
CDU/CSU -0.111 -0.030
[0.068] [0.018]
SPD -0.154** -0.041**
[0.074] [0.020]
Green Party 0.091 0.025
[0.084] [0.023]
Left Party 0.157* 0.042*
[0.085] [0.023]
Other Parties -0.115 -0.031
[0.113] [0.031]
State characteristicsb
Average budget deficit over last three years (H1) -0.326*** -0.088*** -0.567*** -0.098***
[0.033] [0.009] [0.050] [0.008]
Debt rule index (H3) 2.730*** 0.734*** 4.005*** 0.691***
[0.289] [0.076] [0.400] [0.067]
GDP per capita 0.027*** 0.007*** 0.023*** 0.004***
[0.005] [0.001] [0.007] [0.001]
Dummy for consolidation assistance -0.718*** -0.193*** -1.074*** -0.185***
[0.089] [0.023] [0.128] [0.022]
Fiscal equalization transfers to GDP -0.356*** -0.096*** -0.719*** -0.124***
[0.051] [0.013] [0.091] [0.015]
Government coalition consists of right parties 0.589*** 0.158*** 0.788*** 0.136***
[0.072] [0.019] [0.096] [0.016]
Cross state dimension
Own state (H4) 0.801*** 0.215*** 1.213*** 0.209***
[0.105] [0.028] [0.174] [0.029]
Home state fixed effects X X
Person fixed effects X X
Regression diagnostics
Observations 10,208 10,224
Pseudo-R2 0.257 0.519
p-value joint significance of all variables 0.000 0.000
p-value joint significance of all individual variables 0.000 n.a.
p-value joint significance of party-dummies 0.000 n.a.
p-value joint significance of state characteristics 0.000 0.000
Notes: */**/*** denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level; Standard errors in brackets; a: base category is the market
oriented liberal democratic party ”FDP”; b: State characteristics are 2010 data for survey waves 1 and 2, which both
took place in 2011, and 2011 data for survey wave 3, which took place in 2012.
of eleven “optimistic” states (see column (2) of Table 2.4). We make use of the subsample
for “pessimistic” states to distinguish between the two competing theories which can cause
insiders to be more confident than outsiders.
The estimated coefficient for the dummy for own-state evaluation remains significantly
positive in both subsamples, indicating that even those politicians from pessimistic states
are more confident when it comes to the evaluation of their own state. According to our
theory, this finding is only consistent with the explanation based on overconfidence, not
noisy information. The finding is robust to splitting the sample on the basis of a stricter
rule (i.e. pins < 0.34 and pins > 0.66). The own state dummy enters significantly with a
positive sign, thereby confirming our H4 hypothesis on overconfidence.16 Compared to our
baseline regressions, most of the other coefficients remain robust in signs and significance in
both samples.
The other control variables in column (1) of Table 2.3 are important to understand the
heterogeneity of expectations, as well. The observed education characteristics do not show
up significantly. Members of the budget committee view adherence to the debt brake as more
difficult. Moreover, a longer parliamentary experience reduces compliance expectation. This
finding is not driven by an age effect which is separately controlled for and does not enter
significantly in the baseline estimations. Female legislators are significantly more pessimistic
than their male colleagues. Party imprint on compliance expectations is moderate: Whereas
social democratic politicians seem to be less optimistic than the liberal democrats (i.e. the
base category) on average, politicians from the Left Party are significantly more optimistic.
States with a government consisting of right parties (i.e. Christian Democrats and/or
FDP) are perceived to have a higher chance of compliance. Consolidation aid does not seem
to compensate for the less favorable economic and fiscal conditions of the five related states
since the related dummy is significantly negative.
16 Results are not shown here but are available upon request.
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Table 2.4: Likelihood of state’s compliance - check H4: sample splits by Table A.2
pins < 0.5 pins > 0.5
(1) (2)
Independent Variables Baseline 1 for
BE, HB, NW,
SL, TH
Average
marginal
effects
Baseline 1 for BB, BW,
BY, HE, HH, MV, NI,
RP, SH, SN, ST
Average
marginal
effects
Individual: education
Tertiary degree 0.124* 0.022* -0.036 -0.010
[0.074] [0.013] [0.042] [0.012]
Economics/Business degree -0.211*** -0.038*** 0.091** 0.027**
[0.081] [0.015] [0.044] [0.013]
Individual: parliamentary role
Member of governing parties in state (H4) 0.201** 0.036** 0.217*** 0.063***
[0.099] [0.018] [0.056] [0.016]
Member of budget committee -0.176** -0.032** -0.164*** -0.048***
[0.083] [0.015] [0.046] [0.013]
Number of years in parliament -0.011** -0.002** -0.005* -0.001*
[0.005] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001]
Individual: other demographic variables
Female -0.268*** -0.048*** -0.069* -0.020*
[0.072] [0.013] [0.036] [0.011]
Age in years 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001
[0.004] [0.001] [0.002] [0.000]
Individual: preferences and bailout-expectation
Desirability of own state’s unconditional compliance 0.049*** 0.009*** 0.073*** 0.021***
[0.019] [0.003] [0.013] [0.004]
Preference for fiscal consolidation (debt reduction) 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.001***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Index for perceived strength of budget constraint (H2) 0.062*** 0.011*** 0.043*** 0.013***
[0.011] [0.002] [0.006] [0.002]
Individual: party affiliationa
CDU/CSU -0.129 -0.023 -0.111 -0.032
[0.156] [0.028] [0.078] [0.023]
SPD -0.330* -0.059* -0.112 -0.032
[0.176] [0.032] [0.086] [0.025]
Green Party 0.093 0.017 0.089 0.026
[0.161] [0.029] [0.106] [0.031]
Left Party 0.165 0.030 0.149 0.043
[0.179] [0.032] [0.098] [0.029]
Other Parties -0.156 -0.028 -0.119 -0.035
[0.202] [0.036] [0.140] [0.041]
State characteristicsb
Average budget deficit over last three years (H1) -0.059 -0.011 -0.627*** -0.182***
[0.201] [0.036] [0.044] [0.011]
Debt rule index (H3) 4.120** 0.741** 2.509*** 0.728***
[1.719] [0.310] [0.293] [0.082]
GDP per capita 0.010 0.002 -0.004 -0.001
[0.025] [0.005] [0.004] [0.001]
Dummy for consolidation assistance -1.155*** -0.208*** -0.695*** -0.202***
[0.204] [0.036] [0.094] [0.027]
Fiscal equalization transfers to GDP -0.047 -0.008 -0.901*** -0.261***
[0.124] [0.022] [0.062] [0.016]
Government coalition consists of right parties 0.069 0.012 0.277*** 0.080***
[0.299] [0.054] [0.057] [0.016]
Cross state dimension
Own state (H4) 0.491*** 0.088*** 0.902*** 0.262***
[0.132] [0.024] [0.110] [0.031]
Home state fixed effects X X X X
Regression diagnostics
Observations 3190 7018
Pseudo-R2 0.204 0.245
p-value joint significance of all variables 0.000 0.000
p-value joint significance of all individual variables 0.000 0.000
p-value joint significance of party-dummies 0.001 0.007
p-value joint significance of state characteristics 0.000 0.000
Notes: */**/*** denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level; Standard errors in brackets; a: base category is the market
oriented liberal democratic party ”FDP”; b: State characteristics are 2010 data for survey waves 1 and 2, which both took
place in 2011, and 2011 data for survey wave 3, which took place in 2012. BB=Brandenburg, BE=Berlin, BW=Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg, BY=Bavaria, HB=Bremen, HE=Hesse, HH=Hamburg, MV=Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, NI=Lower
Saxony, NW= North Rhine-Westphalia, RP=Rhineland-Palatinate, SH=Schleswig-Holstein, SL=Saarland, SN=Saxony,
ST=Saxony-Anhalt, TH=Thuringia
To check for the general validity of our results, we employ various model variants: In
column (2) of Table 2.3 we allow for individual fixed effects. This specification accounts
for the risk that omitted individual characteristics may bias the results. No substantial
differences in the coefficients to the state characteristics emerge.
2.4.2 Robustness of results
The results presented above are robust with respect to the use of different variables captur-
ing state fiscal conditions (see Table A.3 in the appendix): Just like the average deficit, the
debt stock and the need for consolidation enter highly significantly and with a negative sign.
The impact of almost all other variables remains as in the baseline regressions. Only the
coefficients to the fiscal equalization transfers change significance and signs across specifica-
tions. We believe that this can be explained by the fact that debt is highly correlated with
financial equalization transfers17, whereas the average deficit is not.
A concern about the validity of our data could originate from sample selection. For
our survey, Heinemann et al. (2015) have conducted a unit non-response analysis. They
make use of data on the personal characteristics for all 1683 legislators, not only those
who responded.18 According to these results, significant drivers of survey participation are:
education (degree in economics or business), budget committee membership, membership in
government coalition parties and gender. Thus, our regressions comprise as controls those
factors which are important drivers of non-response. This greatly reduces the potential for
selection bias (Little and Vartivarian, 2005). As a further robustness check, we employ a
weighted regression (see Table A.4 in the appendix). For the weighting, we use the inverse
response probability based on party and state affiliation. The essential findings for our four
17 The correlation coefficient amounts to 0.76.
18 We do not face severe item non-response but predominantly unit non-response. Item non-response
amounts to less than 1% of respondents and is therefore negligible for the survey at hand.
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key hypotheses are confirmed. Compared to the non-weighted regression there are only
minor changes in the size of average marginal effects.
2.5 Summary
In this paper we have argued that an effective fiscal rule should impact on the expectations
and beliefs of those politicians who decide on the government budget. Our study of the
debt brake in Germany reveals an imperfect credibility of the fiscal rule and points to highly
heterogeneous expectations with respect to sub-national compliance.
We see a key finding in the asymmetric expectations of insiders and outsiders, both for
the government versus opposition and the in-state versus out-of-state dimensions. This re-
sult might be considered unproblematic, if the governing parties and politicians in the state
under consideration were better informed and therefore more trustworthy in their judgments
than outsiders. Our empirical findings based on a theoretical model point to a different
direction, however. Insiders (in-state politicians, members from governing coalition parties)
are more optimistic than outsiders and are likely to be subject to an overconfidence bias.
Our theoretical analysis suggests that overconfidence tends to have a self-fulfilling effect.
Overconfident insiders underestimate the size of future fiscal shocks (and resulting adjust-
ment costs) and therefore see the benefits from compliance in better reach than outsiders.
This in turn creates a larger incentive to consolidate from the beginning. Overconfidence
may thus increase the probability of compliance.
The analysis allows to draw tentative conclusions that are relevant for the design of fiscal
rules also in the European context. They are presented in the conclusions of this thesis
(Chapter 6).
43
3 Tax Competition in Europe - Europe in Competition
with Other World Regions?
3.1 Introduction
Corporate tax levels have fallen substantially in Europe during the last decades. Figure 3.1
shows the development of the average EATRs for four world regions which are covered in
this study: Latin America, Europe, Asia-Pacific and North America. Among these regions,
the development of effective tax levels in Europe appears most remarkable. The average
European EATR has fallen substantially from approximately 30% in 1996 to approximately
20% in 2012 (see Figure 3.1). The downward trend in taxation levels in Europe is steady
over time, however, the decline pre 2005 is more distinct than post 2005. Unlike in other
regions, the average EATR in Latin America has risen slightly over the period from 1996
to 2012. In North America and in the Asia-Pacific region the average EATR has fallen,
however, less dramatically than in Europe. There is a broad literature which stipulates that
the global decline in corporate tax levels is due to tax competition. However, none of these
studies explicitly asks the question whether tax competition within these regions is different
from tax competition across these regions. Focusing on Europe, this study aims to answer
the following question: Is the decline in corporate tax levels in Europe mainly driven by
tax competition between EU member states or is it (also) due to pressure from other world
regions?
The investigation of this question deserves special attention for helping to assess possible
tax harmonization designs in the EU: The desirability of tax harmonization within the EU is
linked to the relationship of the EU with third countries and other world regions. In a glob-
alized world, tax competition might not stop at the European border. Tax harmonization
would possibly reduce tax pressure within Europe, however, the pressure from outside would
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not vanish if it exists. By harmonizing their tax systems, member states might lose their
flexibility to react to tax changes in countries from other world regions. Scho¨n (2003, p. 28)
describes this as the member states putting themselves into a “straitjacket”. On the other
hand, Scho¨n (2003) remarks that the existence of other economic areas could make harmo-
nization within Europe even more necessary in order to reduce transaction and compliance
cost within Europe, and make Europe as a whole, more competitive compared to other world
regions. Due to pressure from outside Europe, the positive effects of tax competition (e.g.
disciplining public budgets) would still apply in an harmonized system. Complementary to
this reasoning, Sørensen (2004) sets up a general equilibrium model in which he distinguishes
between global and regional tax coordination. He makes the point, that regional tax coor-
dination might not be desirable when considering third countries. This paper contributes to
this discussion by analyzing the extent of tax competition within Europe on the one hand,
and between Europe and other world regions on the other hand.
Empirically, the paper follows the classical spatial econometrics approach in the public
finance literature. I specify a dynamic panel data model for explaining effective tax levels
and apply an instrumental variable approach. When interpreting the results, I take the
recent literature on local government interactions into account which shows that applying the
standard instruments in tax reaction functions might not control for possible common shocks
or spatially correlated (unobservable) effects and therefore can overestimate the strength of
strategic interactions (see, e.g., Baskaran, 2014, 2015; Isen, 2014; Lyytika¨inen, 2012).
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Figure 3.1: Development of effective average tax rates (EATRs)
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3.2 Background and literature
3.2.1 Foreign direct investment and regional economic blocs
There are reasons why tax competition between countries of the same regional bloc might be
more intense than between countries of different regional blocs.19 If trade costs within the
bloc are low, this may induce countries within the bloc to compete more strongly for FDI
than with countries outside the bloc. This in turn can be reflected in the tax setting behavior
of governments when corporate taxes are not coordinated or harmonized. Governments
might want to influence multinational firm’s FDI from outside a region which can choose
19 Regional blocs can be distinct from each other for several reasons: Firstly, distance between countries
of the same regional bloc is often smaller than across blocs. Secondly, cultural barriers within a regional
bloc are likely to be smaller and consumer preferences to be more similar. And thirdly, countries within
a region are likely to have both bilateral trade treaties and free trade area agreements. Also see Motta
and Norman (1996) for the term “regional bloc”.
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to either produce (i) in each country of the region, (ii) produce in one country within the
region and use that location as export-platform, or (iii) export its products from its home
market (see, e.g., Motta and Norman, 1996). Likewise, companies from within the region
need to decide where to locate most efficiently. Decisive factors for this can be trade costs
and barriers to FDI within and across regional blocs.
The effects of global regionalism and economic integration on the choice between export-
ing and FDI have been analyzed in theoretical papers: Motta and Norman (1996) emphasize
the relevance and impact that regional blocs have on firms. They show that economic in-
tegration within a bloc causes outside firms to invest in the regional bloc. Crucially, firms
do not invest equally in each country of the bloc but make use of “intra-regional export
platform FDI, with the investing firm supplying the majority of the countries in the regional
bloc by intra-regional export” (Motta and Norman, 1996, p. 775). In addition to this “third
country” perspective, Motta and Norman (1996) point out that FDI activity of inside firms
might actually decrease, since they will choose intra-regional exports instead of dispersed
FDI when intra-regional trade costs are sufficiently low. Both these effects intensify tax
competition between countries within the regional bloc: Firstly, inside countries have an
incentive to compete for the (additional) FDI attracted by the economically integrated area
from third countries. And secondly, the less diversified within-bloc FDI makes inside coun-
tries compete more intensively for FDI than they would in less integrated areas. Similar
implications arise when considering the theoretical FDI papers of Rowthorn (1992), Motta
(1992) and Smith (1987).20 This competition might be reflected in the tax setting behavior
of states.
Closely related to the general term “regional bloc” are free-trade areas. Ekholm et al.
(2007) analyze the possibility of export-platform foreign direct investment and show that a
20 Rowthorn (1992) analyzes intra-industry trade and investment under oligopoly and emphasizes the role
of market size and trade barriers between countries. Motta (1992) and Smith (1987) model firms’ choice
between direct investment and exporting.
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free trade area can give incentives to multinationals to invest in that area. The model shows
that under certain conditions, multinationals would only invest in one of the countries in the
free-trade area, and serve the rest of the free-trade area by exports. In line with the theoret-
ical studies, there is strong empirical evidence that free-trade areas attract investments from
third countries and that multinationals choose one country within the area as an export-
platform (see, e.g., Ekholm et al., 2007, for US multinationals’ investment in NAFTA and
the EU21, Blonigen et al., 2007, for US multinationals’ investment in the EU, and Blomstrom
and Kokko, 1997, for investments in CUSFTA). These empirical studies confirm Motta and
Norman’s theory-based hypothesis of higher FDI inflows from third countries into regional
blocs and less intra-bloc FDI.
With respect to Europe, there is reliable evidence that regional integration has affected
FDI and trade flows within and into Europe. Pain (1997), for example, finds that U.K.
direct investments into other EU countries have been stimulated by the internal market pro-
gramme. Crucially, he also identifies some U.K. firms to have diverted their investments
from the United States into the EU. This adds an additional aspect and provides micro-level
evidence that regional economic blocs do not function independently to third countries.22
Similarly, Baltagi et al. (2008) argue that the European Agreements on trade liberalization
did not only affect trade flows but also FDI. They emphasize the interdependence of alloca-
tion decisions and conclude that “a sizable stimulus of investment in one country or region
eventually causes a reduction of investment in other countries or regions” (Baltagi et al.,
2008, p. 195).
21 They show that US affiliates in free-trade areas (EU and NAFTA) mainly export within the free-trade
area. The paper finds that it is not so much about countries’ membership in NAFTA and the EU but
more about countries belonging to the same geographical area. They argue that this is likely due to
“North American and European locations [constituting] relatively integrated markets independent of
the formation of formal free-trade areas through NAFTA and the EU” (Ekholm et al., 2007, p. 789).
22 Baldwin et al. (1995) also detect investment diversion in the European context.
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3.2.2 Tax competition
There are two papers which explicitly draw the relationship between regional economic inte-
gration, FDI flows and tax interactions. Raff (2004) shows theoretically that FDI is likely to
increase in an integrated region and that countries within that region might have an incen-
tive to attract FDI from the rest of the world by a favorable tax environment. The setting
reflects the real world in the sense that (i) trade within regional blocs is likely to be less
costly than across regions, and (ii) tax policies within regions are hardly harmonized.
Redoano (2014) connects to this reasoning and is closely related to this paper as it
also focuses on the European context. Her main hypothesis states that “the lower cost
of cross-border FDI between EU member countries, on the one hand, and the lack of tax
harmonization programs between members, on the other hand, should cause EU countries
to compete more intensively for FDI amongst themselves than with countries outside the
EU” (Redoano, 2014, p. 354). Empirically, the hypothesis of more intense tax competition
within the EU is confirmed on the basis of a Western European data set.
This paper goes one step further and analyzes how far tax competition within Europe and
between Europe and the rest of the world differs. I closely relate to the empirical literature
which attempts to identify strategic interactions among countries by using tax reaction func-
tions.23 Devereux et al. (2008) analyse for 21 OECD countries if they compete with respect
to their corporate taxes. They find compelling evidence for international tax competition
in statutory tax rates. States also seem to interact with respect to the effective tax rates.
Although evidence for this is weak. The study does not show whether the results are driven
23 Besides the empirical studies, the theoretical strand of the existing tax competition literature tries to
identify conditions under which different possible consequences of tax competition occur (for example
a race to the bottom). See, e.g., Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Gordon (1986), Razin and Sadka
(1991) and Zodrow (2006). Other papers determine theoretically, in which dimension (e.g. statutory
tax rates) countries compete with each other. See, e.g., Haufler and Schjelderup (2000), Devereux et al.
(2008), Fuest and Hemmelgarn (2005) and Becker and Fuest (2011).
Descriptive studies have shown how various tax parameters have developed over the last centuries. See,
e.g., Elschner et al. (2011), Devereux et al. (2002), Gorter and de Mooij (2001) and Devereux (2007).
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by certain country constellations or country clusters and is therefore unable to address the
research questions posed by this paper. Egger and Raff (2014) develop a theoretical model
which allows for two dimensions of interactions, i.e. interaction in tax rates and tax bases.
In their empirical contribution, they show that observed changes in countries’ tax rates and
bases are a consequence of increased trade integration.
In the European context, Crabbe´ (2013) shows by means of tax reaction functions that
EU15 member states which are geographically close to the new Eastern European member
states, react more strongly to the new member states’ tax levels than more remote EU15
countries do. Similarly, Davies and Voget (2008) find that the extension of the EU has
intensified tax competition. However, these studies do not answer the question whether EU
states compete with other world regions. A recent study by Altshuler and Goodspeed (2015)
is related to the research question of this paper, as it poses the question whether the US acts
as a Stackelberg leader for the European countries. However, their measure for taxation,
corporate tax revenues divided by GDP, is vulnerable to cyclical effects within and/or across
regions and is only an indirect measure for effective average tax rates. A further study by
Overesch and Rincke (2011) also finds strong (weak) evidence for competition in statutory
tax rates (effective average tax rates) in Europe. Given that their data only consists of
European countries, their paper cannot address the questions raised in this paper, i.e. how
far tax competition within Europe and between Europe and the rest of the world differs.
3.3 Empirical methodology
The tax competition literature referred to in section 3.2.2 makes use of tax reaction func-
tions to detect strategic interaction among countries. Tax reaction functions assume that a
country’s level of corporate taxes is a function of the level of corporate taxes in the other
countries. Theoretically, it is possible that country i reacts differently to all other countries.
However, most of the literature that uses tax reaction functions makes the assumption that
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country i reacts to the average level of corporate taxes of all other countries. This assumption
is mainly due to data limitations, since in the case of country specific response possibilities
the number of coefficients to be estimated would equal the number of countries. The liter-
ature has solved this problem by building an average of the tax levels of all other countries
and making an ex-ante choice about the weighting of the countries in this average. Thus,
the variable of interest is the weighted average tax level of all other countries (excluding
country i) which is called “spatial lag”. In this case, only one coefficient is estimated which
then captures how country i reacts to the average tax rate of all other countries.24 In my
paper, I use specifications which allow for more than one average in order to detect country
constellations and regions which drive the results.
With respect to the weighting scheme, there have been different approaches in the liter-
ature, for example theory-based weights like GDP or trade flows. However, these weighting
variables might be related to the corporate tax levels themselves and therefore be endogenous.
Recently, Klemm and Parys (2012) have used uniform weights and Redoano (2014) distance
weights which both circumvent the additional endogeneity problem which other weighting
schemes cause. I choose to use both uniform and distance weights in all specifications which
constitutes a first robustness test for the results.25
Besides the average taxes of the other countries, the tax level of a country might also be
determined by its own tax level in the previous period because countries face adjustment costs
when changing their effective average tax rate (EATR). Consequently, the EATR adjusts only
gradually when exogenous factors change and does not jump into a new equilibrium instantly.
Therefore, I specify a dynamic model with the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory
variable. Dynamic models have been applied in similar circumstances before, for example by
24 E.g., Devereux et al. (2008) use one average when testing whether or not there is international tax
competition.
25 As distance measure I use simple geodesic distances provided by the research institute CEPII. I use the
inverse distance as weight and row normalize the weights to one.
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Cassette et al. (2012) in a local taxation context or by Foucault et al. (2008) in the context
of public spending interactions in French municipalities; recently Redoano (2014) applies it
when testing for tax competition between countries. The results of this paper show that a
government’s choice on its country’s EATR is highly path-dependent.
In the specification, the EATR of country i = 1, ..., N at time t = 1, ..., T is denoted by
τit where N is the number of countries and T represents the number of time periods. The
tax reaction function of state i can be written as (baseline specification):
τit = γτit−1 + δ
N∑
j 6=i
wijτjt + Xitβ + ρtr + αi + εit (3.1)
where αi is a country-specific fixed effect, ρtr represents a regional linear time trend and εit
is an error term.26
The EATR of country i is a function of the average EATR of the other countries, which is
represented by the spatial lag term
∑N
j 6=iwijτjt. Parameter wij is the weight with which the
EATR of country j (τjt) goes into the average EATR of the other countries when explaining
the EATR of country i. Xit represents a vector of sensible control variables which vary over
time.
The dynamic nature of the specification imposes (internal) validity problems. In an ordi-
nary OLS regression, the country-fixed effect in the error term causes the lagged dependent
variable to be upward biased. The problem of endogeneity does not vanish when using fixed-
or random-effects OLS estimations (Nickell, 1981). Dynamic panel data estimators tackle
this problem by constructing first differenced regression equations. The error term and the
first differenced lagged dependent variable are still correlated in such specifications, however,
26 In the main specifications I do not include time dummies due to their high multicollinearity with the
spatial lag (see, e.g., Elhorst, 2010; Klemm and Parys, 2012; Devereux et al., 2008). However, I use
regional linear time trends for the four world regions to allow for unobserved factors to vary over time.
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this can be circumvented by instrumenting the difference of the lagged dependent variable
by lags of its levels (or differences).
With tax reaction functions, there is a second major endogeneity concern: the spatial lag
is endogenous by assumption because tax reaction functions explicitly state that countries
interact with each other. Thus, the error term of country i is correlated with the spatial lag
because country i itself has an influence on the tax setting behavior of the other countries.
Previous literature deals with this problem by instrumenting the spatial lag by the (weighted)
average covariates of all other countries (i.e. the countries contained in the spatial lag). The
literature argues that these covariates qualify as instruments as they are uncorrelated with
the error term of country i (exogeneity condition fulfilled) but are correlated with the other
countries’ tax levels (instruments are relevant).27 However, recent literature shows that the
exogeneity condition could be doubted to be fulfilled in the case of possible common shocks
or spatially correlated unobserved effects (e.g. Baskaran, 2014, 2015). The covariates in
country j could be correlated with the EATR in country i through a spatially correlated
unobserved factor that determines both the covariates and the EATRs. I mitigate this
problem by applying country-fixed effects which control for all time invariant (spatially
correlated) unobserved factors.
I use system GMM, as proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998), to apply instruments to
both the lagged dependent variable and the spatial lag in order to address both endogeneity
problems described above.28 System GMM uses lagged levels for instrumenting current
differences and lagged differences for instrumenting current levels. Beside the benefit of
using internal instruments, it is also possible to include additional (exogenous) variables as
27 The covariates of the other countries are averaged by the same weighting scheme which applies to the
spatial lag. This approach is also chosen by, for example, Devereux et al. (2008), Davies and Voget
(2008), Klemm and Parys (2012) and Redoano (2014).
28 Klemm and Parys (2012) also recently applied system GMM in the context of tax reaction functions.
Furthermore, Madariaga and Poncet (2007) apply this method in the context of FDI spillovers and
Foucault et al. (2008) in the context of public spending interactions. Similarly, Cassette et al. (2012)
use difference GMM for analyzing local tax competition.
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instruments which are not part of the second stage regression specification. This is useful for
the setting in this paper in order to use the covariates of the other countries to instrument
the spatial lag.29 In the international tax setting context at hand, system GMM has the
additional benefit that it can deal with the only modest adjustments in effective tax levels
in some countries by taking into account interactions in levels as well as in first differences.
With respect to the assumptions of system GMM, the Hansen J test of overidentifying
restrictions allows to check whether the instruments are correlated with the residuals. The
null hypothesis that there is no correlation between instruments and residuals cannot be
rejected for any of the regressions conducted in the analysis. Furthermore, the Arellano and
Bond (1991) statistics on the first and second order autocorrelation of the first-differenced
residuals is employed. The second order correlation is relevant since the model is specified
in first differences and the autocorrelation in levels needs to be checked.30
3.4 Data
Country coverage
The (balanced) panel data underlying the analysis covers 44 countries over the period 1996 to
2012. The data consists of four world regions, namely Europe, North America, Latin America
and the Asia-Pacific region. Naturally, the European region makes up for the majority of the
44 countries.31 For competition in FDI the effective average tax rate (EATR) is the relevant
measure as argued by Devereux and Griffith (1998, p. 337) and Devereux and Griffith (2003).
Besides statutory tax rates, EATRs also take into account depreciation methods for assets
29 I restrict the number of instruments by only using one lag in order to keep the number of instruments
manageable as suggested by Roodman (2009, p. 124). This lag specification applies to all regressions
in the paper. The robust option is used in order to produce results robust to heteroskedasticity and
“arbitrary patterns of autocorrelation” within countries Roodman (2009, p. 123).
30 The null hypothesis of no autocorrelation cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level for the baseline
results (Table 3.1) except for one regression.
31 Tables B.6 and B.7 in the appendix provide information on the countries covered.
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and the valuation method for inventories. This is important to measure when governments
do not only interact with respect to statutory tax rates, but also use favorable depreciation
schemes to become more attractive for FDI.32
Development of Effective Average Tax Rates
The dynamics related to the EU enlargement in 2004 deserve special attention. The
data shows that the average EATR in Europe has decreased significantly from 1996 to 2012
(Figure 3.1 in section 3.1 and Table B.8 in the appendix). More precisely, the mean EATR
of the EU28 has fallen from 29.5% in 1996 to 20.4% in 2012. However, there are substan-
tial differences between the old (EU15) and the new member states (EU13). Throughout
time, the mean EATR of the EU15 was higher than the one of the EU13. Additionally, the
dynamics of the EATRs were different between the two groups. The new member states
lowered their mean EATR drastically until 2004 (year of entry into the EU for the EU10).
Afterwards, they kept decreasing their tax rates, however, the downward pace became con-
siderably slower. In contrast, the old member states lowered their mean EATR during the
pre-enlargement period less drastically but then slightly increased their downward movement
after the enlargement. Empirical studies show that the EU extension is likely to have played
a causal role for the observed dynamics (Davies and Voget, 2008; Crabbe´, 2013). I will take
this into account in the analysis.
Control Variables
For the empirical analysis, I merge the EATR data with a set of time varying control vari-
ables. Government consumption expenditure (Gov′t Consumptionit) is supposed to reflect
the need of a government (or society) to generate tax revenues in order to serve its pref-
erences for the provision of public goods and redistributive policies. In addition, I include
32 Section B.2.1 in the appendix explains the data sources and computation assumptions.
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demographic variables which might have an effect on the tax setting behavior of states, i.e.
the share of people living in urban areas (Urbanit) and the share of dependents as percent
of the working-age population (Dependencyit). To capture the openness of an economy, I
borrow a measure used by Overesch and Rincke (2011); it is computed by summing up a
country’s imports and exports and dividing it by its GDP (Opennessit). The effect of this
openness measure is ambiguous because, on the one hand, the (un-)openness of an economy
shows if a government succeeds to attract foreign FDI and, on the other hand, high trade
volumes can also indicate that multinationals find it more attractive to serve the market
by imports rather than by direct investments as argued in section 3.2. To control for the
size of an economy and thus for its possible market power, the GDP (GDPit) of the respec-
tive country is included. Table B.5 in the appendix provides descriptive statistics for these
covariates and the EATR.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Main results
Global Tax Competition
The first specification reflects the presented baseline regression in section 3.3, i.e. the
EATR of country i is explained by the weighted average EATR of all other countries. The
results in column 1 (uniform weighting) and 2 (distance weighting) in Table 3.1 show no
evidence for international tax competition. The single spatial lag is neither significant for
the uniform weights nor for the distance weights. This contributes to an already ambiguous
literature in which some papers find evidence for international tax competition (beyond
European tax competition) in a single spatial lag framework (e.g., Devereux et al., 2008)
and some papers do not (Davies and Voget, 2008, p. 26 column 2 and 3). The assumption
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that states adjust their tax parameters only gradually towards a new equilibrium is confirmed
by the high and significant coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in Table 3.1.
The main result, namely that the spatial lag is not positively significant, raises the ques-
tion if this also holds when I refine my approach and look at more regional tax competition.
It is conceivable that the last result is not so much a sign of non-existence of tax competition
between countries but more a sign for tax competition taking place rather within regional
blocs than across regions as argued in the theoretical part of this paper.
Regional Tax Competition
In the following, I take regional tax competition aspects into consideration by regressing
the EATR of country i on the weighted average EATR of the other countries in the region
of country i. The analysis provides no evidence for the existence of general tax competition
within regions (column 3 and 4 in Table 3.1). Both the spatial lag of the uniform and
the distance specification are not significant at the 10% significance level. This result is
relatively remarkable given that European countries make up the majority of the sample.
However, when dropping the non-European observations and reducing the sample size, the
spatial lag turns significantly positive in the uniform specification (column 5 and 6 in Table
3.1). This indication of tax competition within Europe is confirmed and becomes stronger
in the subsequent specifications (see below) and is in line with the literature. However, the
details are different: Overesch and Rincke (2011) find evidence for tax competition within
Europe, however, only with respect to statutory tax rates. Davies and Voget (2008) also
find evidence for tax competition within Europe when looking at the EATR. They use a
static model whereas this study confirms the result by means of a dynamic model. Redoano
(2014) also shows that there is European tax competition with data which focuses Western
European countries.
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Tax Competition in Europe - Europe in Competition with other World Regions?
For tax policy in Europe, the question of European tax competition is important. For
the desirability and the design of tax coordination or harmonization, however, it is also very
relevant whether or not there is evidence that European countries react to effective tax levels
of non-European countries as argued in the introduction.
The regressions in column 7 and 8 in Table 3.1 address this question. The EATR of
the European countries is regressed on the (weighted) average EATR of the other European
countries and the (weighted) average EATR of all non-European countries. Consistent with
the previous result, the European spatial lag (“Spatial lag same region”) is now even more
positive and statistically significant for both types of weighting schemes. However, evidence
for the relevance of the effective tax levels of the non-European countries is weak. The
spatial lag for the non-European countries is only significant at the 10% significance level for
the uniform weights and not significant at all for the distance weights. When refining this
approach and splitting the non-European spatial lag into its regional components, evidence
for tax pressure from other world regions on the European countries vanishes altogether.
Neither the spatial lag for North America, Latin America nor the Asian-Pacific region shows
any statistically significant effect (column 9 and 10 in Table 3.1). This result confirms the
FDI papers on economic integration and export-platform FDI. They suggest that economic
integration leads to tougher competition for FDI within the integrated area whereas it is not
clear if competition between regional blocs intensifies. From the results, it can be cautionary
concluded that there does not seem to be evidence for tax pressure on European countries
from other world regions. Instead, the fall in effective tax rates in Europe can be attributed
to tax competition within Europe.
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3.5.2 Robustness of results
Throughout the paper I apply both uniform and distance weights. Both circumvent any
additional endogeneity problem which might occur when using weights like trade or FDI
flows. Regional interaction effects turn out to be stronger with uniform weights than with
distance weights. This hints at the fact that distance does not matter anymore when looking
at countries within the same region.33 However, all main conclusions derived from the results
hold for both regression specifications. In the following, I run further robustness checks with
respect to time effects and the construction of regional blocs. Additionally, the results are
extended to European tax competition considerations.
Construction of Regional Blocs
The FDI literature analyzing export-platform strategies and countries’ competition for
FDI looks at both “free-trade areas” and “regional blocs”, the latter being a more general
concept of an integrated economic area. Free-trade areas often constitute an integrated
economic area before the formalization through a free-trade agreement as argued by Ekholm
et al. (2007). Therefore, the empirical analysis of this paper rather focuses on geographically
and economically integrated regions than explicitly considering free-trade areas.
In the case of Mexico, the question arises if it is more integrated with Latin Ameri-
can or with North America (through NAFTA). Therefore, I conduct a sensitivity analysis
which affiliates Mexico to North America when analyzing whether there is tax competition
within regions. Table B.1 in the appendix confirms that there is no general evidence for tax
competition within regions.
With respect to European countries, the paper does not strictly focus on EU membership
in the main analysis. Even if a country is not member of the EU or only joined the EU at a
33 Because of this argument, Klemm and Parys (2012) only use uniform weights when analyzing regional
tax competition.
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later stage, the European economies show a substantial degree of integration due to privileged
free-trade relationships. Consequently, I also include Switzerland, Norway and Turkey in the
main analysis which have well-established economic relationships with the EU (e.g. through
EFTA in the case of Switzerland and Norway). For robustness I run regressions that rather
focus on the EU instead of Europe by excluding the latter three countries. The main results
remain valid (Column 3-8 in Table B.1), however, statistical significance for tax competition
within Europe becomes slightly weaker.
Time Effects
The main specifications do not include time dummies, since they would be almost iden-
tical to the spatial lag. The time dummy would represent the average tax level in a given
year. The spatial lag, in turn, also represents the (weighted) average tax level in a given
year, except the tax level of the country of the dependent variable. Due to the high multi-
collinearity between the spatial lag and the time dummy, the spatial lag cannot be interpreted
meaningfully in this case (see, e.g., Elhorst, 2010; Klemm and Parys, 2012; Devereux et al.,
2008). This is especially true with uniform weighting. The problem might be less severe with
distance weights. Therefore, I experiment with time dummies for the distance regressions
and present them in Table B.2. Again, there is no evidence for tax pressure from other
world regions on Europe. With this perspective, evidence for European tax competition also
becomes weaker.
European Considerations
The main results indicate that there is no general tax competition across or within regions.
Tax competition seems to be a relatively specific European phenomenon. The description
in section 3.4 and the studies by Davies and Voget (2008) and Crabbe´ (2013) show that the
EU enlargement process might have contributed to interaction dynamics. Crabbe´ (2013)
emphasizes the new member states’ impact on the old member states which are located
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eastward. Similarly, Davies and Voget (2008) argue that tax competition between the EU
member states is stronger and that the EU enlargement has intensified tax competition in
Europe. When I run the regressions only on the EU15 member states (Table B.3, column
3-4), I find no significant effects and, in a way, the findings of Crabbe´ (2013) and Davies and
Voget (2008) are confirmed. Furthermore, EU28 states seem to react in particular to the
new EU13 member states (Table B.3, column 5-6), which confirms the important role the
EU13 played in the dynamics of European corporate tax competition.
3.6 Summary
Overall, there is a substantial amount of literature which analyses strategic tax interactions
between countries. Especially in the context of the European Union, it has been argued
that member states’ sensitivity to each other has led to lower effective corporate taxes. The
integrated economic area in the EU has arguably promoted this development. The results
of the paper support this but, at the same time, do not show evidence for regional tax
competition in other world regions than Europe. Furthermore, there is no evidence for tax
competition across regions, and more specifically, for the influence of non-European corporate
taxes on tax levels of EU member states.
In general, the implied causalities of the results in classical spatial econometrics frame-
works have to be interpreted cautiously because the exogeneity condition for the instruments
could be violated in case of unobserved common shocks. Recently, Gibbons and Overman
(2012), Lyytika¨inen (2012), Baskaran (2014), and Isen (2014) show that the strength of
detected strategic interactions can be overestimated in that case.34 In light of this, the re-
sult of no inter-regional tax competition gains additional credibility. Although I apply a
method which tends to overestimate strategic interactions, only interactions within Europe
34 These papers analyze interactions at the local level and make use of policy interventions and institutional
variations within and/or across borders to identify interaction effects. This is no feasible approach for
this study which focuses on the country level.
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are found. Overall, only moderately robust evidence for international tax interactions has
been provided by the literature so far, which perhaps has to be treated with caution, given
the new methodical insights form the studies on local jurisdictions.
The results of this study and the former literature allow to make assessments on the
desirability and possible design of corporate tax harmonization in the EU. I present these
considerations in the conclusions of this thesis (Chapter 6).
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4 Decline of CFC Rules and Rise of IP Boxes:
How the European Court of Justice Affects Tax Com-
petition and Economic Distortions in Europe
4.1 Introduction
The long-term goal of the European Union (EU) is to establish and ensure an internal market.
The completion of this “area without internal frontiers” should be encouraged by a consistent
economic policy in each member state favouring “an efficient allocation of resources” in the
European Union.35 This goal, which is derived from economic theory, calls for a neutral tax
system that does not distort investment decisions (e.g. Horst, 1980; Auerbach, 1989). But
given the prevailing substantial differences in corporate tax systems in the EU (e.g. European
Commission, 2001; Endres et al., 2013; Elschner and Vanboerren, 2010), investment decisions
of companies are still significantly distorted by tax considerations until today. This can be
explained by the fact that direct tax policy has remained in the hands of the member states
(e.g. Graetz and Warren Jr, 2006).36
Consequently, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has had a high impact on tax policy
in the EU in the last two decades.37 With respect to corporate taxation, the court’s decisions
focus especially on the elimination of discriminatory measures for cross-border investments.38
Generally, the jurisprudence of the ECJ is intended to contribute to the achievement of the
internal market (e.g. De La Feria and Fuest, 2016; Martin Jime´nez, 1999; Cordewener, 2006;
Syrpis, 2012). The reasoning of the ECJ’s decisions in tax matters has been discussed and
criticized in the legal literature at length (e.g. Lang, 2002; Bizioli, 2008; Pistone, 2010). Most
35 Article 26 and 120 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
36 The European Commission has announced to relaunch a new proposal for a Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) in 2016. See European Commission (2015a).
37 Until today, more than 250 cases concerning issues in direct taxation have been decided by the ECJ.
See European Commission (2015b).
38 Also see Schreiber and Fu¨hrich (2009, p. 259) for an overview.
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papers argue that the ECJ’s jurisprudence lacks clear guidance for the member states when
it comes to defining what exactly EU-law compliant tax policy is.
In contrast to elaborated debates in the legal literature, the ECJ’s jurisprudence has
only scarcely been discussed in the economic literature.39 In the context of direct taxation,
some papers evaluate if the ECJ rather favours capital export or capital import neutrality
(Graetz and Warren Jr, 2006; Mason and Knoll, 2012; Scho¨n, 2015; Spengel, 2003, pp. 256-
262). The only systematic analysis concerning possible effects of the ECJ’s jurisprudence
on tax neutrality is provided by De La Feria and Fuest (2016) by means of a theoretical
model and two case studies. They show that depending on the reaction of the member
states, economic distortions could actually increase due to the ECJ’s decisions. Given the
important role of the ECJ and its impact on the tax systems, the potential consequences for
economic distortions have not been sufficiently investigated yet. The research question at
this interdisciplinary edge between economics and law is, whether the ECJ’s jurisprudence
actually contributes to the reduction of economic distortions caused by the tax systems in
the member states or not.
In our paper, we provide an answer to this question based on a landmark decision of
the ECJ in 2006. In the Cadbury-Schweppes decision, the court limited the applicability of
controlled foreign company (CFC) rules within the EU (European Court of Justice, 2006).
Generally, CFC rules are targeted at specific (highly mobile) activities conducted in a foreign
low-tax country and aim at taxing such income at the higher home country tax rate. CFC
rules have proven to be highly relevant for investment decisions of corporations (Altshuler
and Hubbard, 2003; Ruf and Weichenrieder, 2012). But according to the ECJ, CFC rules
are only compatible with EU law if they are restricted to “wholly artificial arrangements”
that do not unfold any economic activity (e.g. letter boxes). All member states with CFC
39 There are some analyses on the economic effects of the ECJ jurisprudence in other policy fields, e.g.,
public health care. See, e.g., Paulus et al. (2002) and Tridimas and Tridimas (2002).
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rules had to amend their legislation as demanded by the ECJ. Because of this restriction,
CFC rules are of low relevance within the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA)40
nowadays (Fontana, 2006; Smit, 2014). In line with this, Ruf and Weichenrieder (2013)
find increasing investments in low-tax EU countries by German multinationals after the
Cadbury-Schweppes decision in 2006.
With respect to tax neutrality in the EU, the general impact of the Cadbury-Schweppes
decision cannot be determined a priori. Beside the direct effect of the restricted applicability
of CFC rules on tax neutrality, the non-applicability of CFC rules has also widened the
possibility for member states to introduce new favourable tax regimes. Before the ruling,
member states were restricted from offering favourable tax conditions as the application of
CFC rules of another country could eliminate the offered tax incentives. Consequently, this
restricted certain forms of tax competition within the EU before the Cadbury-Schweppes
decision. We argue that the widened possibilities for attracting foreign investments after
the judgement have been promptly used by some countries. The rise of intellectual property
boxes (IP boxes) within the EU, which provide a lower effective tax rate to (specific) income
from IP, can be seen as a direct consequence of the de-facto abolishment of CFC rules. This
is especially true for IP boxes which include acquired IP in addition to self-developed IP.
These IP boxes would not have been introduced in the EU without the judgement, since
they had not unfolded a significant effect due to CFC rules. Nowadays, IP boxes have
proven to influence investment and location decisions of multinationals (Griffith et al., 2014;
Alstadsæter et al., 2015).
The judgement and the reactions of the member states constitute an important case
that allows us to analyze the role of the ECJ. The Cadbury-Schweppes case is particular
40 The judgement of the ECJ has also affected the CFC legislation of the member states of the European
Economic Area (EEA). As the EEA also pursues the goal of an internal market, we include Iceland,
Liechtenstein and Norway in our analysis. See Gudmundsson (2006) for details. We use the term “EU”
in the following for the 28 member states and Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
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suitable, since it enables us to also take into account “second round effects” of the ECJ
jurisprudence - in this case, the emergence of IP boxes. It is the first contribution of this
paper to analyze whether or not the ECJ contributes to the economic goal of an efficient
allocation of resources in the internal market by eliminating tax-induced distortions. By
conducting this analysis, we also take a combined view on two areas (CFC rules and IP
boxes) that are highly debated in the “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (BEPS) project of
the OECD (OECD, 2013; OECD, 2015d). This is the second contribution of this paper.
In our analysis, we rely on the methodology developed by Devereux and Griffith (1999)41
which analyzes the influence of taxes on a hypothetical investment project. We implement
both CFC rules and IP boxes into the model and compute effective tax rates for domestic
and cross-border investments. Similar to previous studies, we use the means and standard
deviations of the modelled tax burdens to assess tax-induced economic distortions in the
internal market (Devereux and Pearson, 1995; Elschner et al., 2011; Ruiz, 2006). For the
time period 2004-2014, we investigate by means of four different (counterfactual) scenar-
ios (with/without CFC rules and with/without IP box regimes) the ECJ’s effect on tax
neutrality in the internal market.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 gives a detailed overview
of CFC rules in the EU member states and how the Cadbury-Schweppes decision in 2006
has impacted them. In addition, we show the main properties of the IP box regimes in the
EU. Section 4.3 presents the Devereux-Griffith model and the implementation of CFC rules
into the model. Section 4.4 provides results for the different scenarios and discusses their
implications. Finally, section 4.5 concludes.
41 See Schreiber et al. (2002) for additional information.
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4.2 CFC rules and IP boxes in the EU member states
In the following, we provide a detailed overview on the properties of CFC rules and IP boxes
in the EU member states from 2004 to 2014 which serves to illustrate how CFC rules and
IP boxes work, how they were affected by the ECJ’s decision, and how they impact the tax
burden of investments.
4.2.1 CFC rules
4.2.1.1 Aim and properties of CFC rules
Most countries use CFC rules as anti-avoidance measures against the extensive use of low tax
jurisdictions by multinational enterprises (Dahlberg and Wiman, 2013, p. 21; Endres and
Spengel, 2015, pp. 339-342).42 Generally, the separation principle in international taxation
enables multinationals to exploit tax differentials across jurisdictions (Graetz, 2003, p. 217).
However, if CFC rules apply, profits of a foreign subsidiary are taxed at the higher tax rate
of the parent’s home country.
A common requirement for CFC rules to be applicable is that the parent company controls
50% or more of the capital of the foreign subsidiary. Otherwise, CFC rules mainly differ with
respect to two dimensions. The first dimension is about the income which is subject to CFC
rules. If the “entity approach” is used, all income that is generated by a foreign subsidiary
is subject to the CFC rule whereas the “transactional” approach restricts the CFC rule’s
applicability to specific kinds of income deemed to be passive (such as royalty or interest
income).
The second dimension determines the exact definition of a low-tax jurisdiction. Two
approaches prevail: If the “threshold approach” is used, a required minimum level of taxation
42 However, in certain circumstances countries may have incentives to not apply CFC rules since they
lower their multinationals’ competitiveness abroad. See for example Brauner and Herzfeld (2013, p.
783) for the United States.
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is defined by the CFC legislation of the home country. The actual tax burden paid in
the foreign country must not fall below a predefined percentage of the hypothetical tax
burden which would accrue if the investment was conducted in the parent’s home country.
In contrast, if the “jurisdictional approach” is used, governments publish official blacklists
and/or whitelists that explicitly name countries for which CFC rules apply and/or do not
apply. However, most countries which use whitelists additionally require a minimum level of
taxation in the source country.
If the CFC rules of the parent’s country are triggered by the income of a foreign subsidiary,
the tax due is calculated according to the tax law of the parent’s country. A tax credit for
the tax paid in the foreign country may be granted to avoid double taxation.
4.2.1.2 Implications of the Cadbury-Schweppes decision
In 2006, the ECJ had to decide on the compatibility of the British CFC rules with EU law
(European Court of Justice, 2006). In the case at hand, a British multinational (Cadbury-
Schweppes) had two subsidiaries in Ireland, one of them receiving substantial amounts of
passive income. Before the ECJ’s decision, the British CFC rule applied to the income of that
Irish subsidiary due to the passive income and the fact that the tax paid in Ireland was below
the minimum level required by the British CFC rule. The ECJ restricted the applicability of
the minimum requirement to wholly artificial arrangements that do not reflect any economic
activity, e.g. pure letter boxes. From the ECJ’s point of view, it was not proven that the
Irish subsidiary was of wholly artificial nature. In this case, CFC rules cannot be justified
and are an infringement to the freedom of establishment.
4.2.1.3 Overview of CFC rules and reactions after the judgement
Before and after the judgement (years 2004 to 2014), CFC rules have been applied in ten EU
member states and in Norway. In addition, Iceland and Greece have introduced CFC rules in
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2009 and 2014, respectively.43 Table C.2 in the appendix provides a detailed overview of the
country-specific CFC rules. Nine countries apply a “threshold approach” to define a low-tax
jurisdiction by setting out a minimum requirement for the level of taxation in the source
countries. Three countries apply the “jurisdictional approach”; however, these countries also
apply a minimum requirement as a subordinate condition.44 In the time period observed,
two countries (Denmark and Italy) changed their approach for defining low-tax jurisdictions.
Apart from the recently introduced CFC regime in Greece, all countries with a threshold
approach refer to the actual tax paid in the source country as the relevant tax measure. With
regard to the acceptable low level of taxes paid in the source country, there is a wide variety
with absolute and relative limits. These limits remain mostly constant over the observed
time period. In case CFC rules apply, a tax credit for the foreign tax paid is available in
nearly all countries.
As a reaction to the Cadbury-Schweppes judgement in 2006, most member states followed
a recommendation of the European Council (2010) and added an exception clause for all EU
countries. This restricts the applicability of CFC rules within the EU to “wholly artificial
arrangements”. Denmark is the only member state that has extended its CFC rules to
domestic income after the judgment. For the Danish CFC rule to apply, only the kind of
income of the subsidiary is decisive, not the level of taxation.45
4.2.2 IP box regimes
Recently, several IP box regimes have emerged within the EU. They offer reduced tax rates
for income that can be attributed to intellectual property. After France (2000) and Hungary
(2003), ten other European countries have introduced IP box regimes until 2014 (Evers et al.,
2015). Some properties of IP box regimes are under on-going review by the EU Commission
43 Poland has introduced CFC rules in 2015.
44 Except of Italy until 2010; afterwards it switched to a “threshold approach”.
45 Up to now, it is unclear whether this extension is compliant with EU law. See Koerver Schmidt (2014).
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as they might constitute a case of forbidden state aid (e.g. Mang, 2015). Also, the OECD
has recently refined its view on the legitimacy of IP boxes in the course of the BEPS project
(OECD, 2015a,b).
Evers et al. (2015) give a detailed overview of the properties of IP boxes in Europe
and compute effective average tax rates (EATR) for self-developed patents by using the
methodology of Devereux and Griffith (1999). In our paper, we model the location choice for
an IP holding company that acquires patents or licenses. Acquired IP is favoured by IP boxes
in Cyprus, France, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg and Malta.46 In all six countries, the
IP box rates are at least 50% lower than the normal rates. Cyprus, Liechtenstein and Malta
offer very low IP box rates that only amount to 2.5% and 0% respectively.
4.3 Methodology
In this section, we present the Devereux-Griffith methodology and our implementation of
CFC rules and IP boxes into the model. The results enable us to analyze the impact of the
ECJ’s Cadbury-Schweppes decision on tax neutrality.
4.3.1 Devereux-Griffith model and implementation of CFC rules
The model proposed by Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003) uses the framework of the neo-
classical investment theory. It computes the effective tax burden on both a hypothetical
marginal and a highly profitable investment project of a company. The corresponding mea-
sures are known as the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) and the effective average tax rate
(EATR) respectively. In this paper, we focus on the EATR since this allows us to analyze
how taxes influence discrete location decisions.47 A detailed description of the methodology
can be found in the appendix. When computing the EATR, the most important regula-
46 See Table C.1 in the appendix.
47 Devereux and Griffith (1998, p. 337) and Devereux and Griffith (2003) show that the EATR is the
relevant tax measure for foreign direct investments (FDI).
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tions of the national tax regimes are taken into account. This includes nominal corporation
tax rates and surcharges as well as regional taxes on profits. In addition, we consider the
depreciation rules of patents for tax purposes. Besides domestic investments, the Devereux-
Griffith model can simulate cross-border investments. When carrying out these simulations
we take withholding taxes on profit repatriation in the source country and the method for
avoiding international double taxation in the investor’s home country into account. For the
implementation of IP boxes we follow Evers et al. (2015) to consider reduced IP box rates
and the treatment of depreciation expenses.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the set-up of the model investment more precisely. The investment
of the company takes place in a wholly owned subsidiary.48 The multinational aims at
acquiring a patent from a third party in order to administer and exploit it commercially.
Theoretically, the acquisition of the patent can be conducted by the parent company or
by any foreign subsidiary. Neglecting non-tax factors, the patent will be acquired in the
country where the effective tax burden on (royalty) income is the lowest.49 We assume
that the subsidiary receives (royalty) income from the exploitation of the acquired patent.
This case unfolds a certain degree of economic activity as the administration and contract
negotiations related to IP require skilled employees (as well as some office space and office
equipment).50
In its judgement, the ECJ stated that only wholly artificial arrangements without any
economic activity are allowed to trigger CFC rules. Conversely, this means that before
the ruling, CFC rules also aimed at investments which constituted real economic activities
like our assumed model investment. That CFC rules have a profound economic impact on
48 We disregard shareholder taxation since it does not affect decisions of corporations when assuming that
there is significant international portfolio investment. Please see Devereux and Pearson (1995, p. 1600).
49 Exit taxation and transfer prices do not play a role since we model a transaction between third parties.
50 In fact, national tax laws of IP box countries also require investments to have some economic substance
in order to qualify for the IP box provisions. Please also see Huibregtse et al. (2011).
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Figure 4.1: Devereux-Griffith model
companies’ real activity abroad is empirically shown for Germany by Egger and Wamser
(2015) and Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012).
In the model, if the parent itself acquires the patent, the generated profits are only taxed
in its home country and the EATR is solely determined by the tax system of the home
country. For cross-border investments, taxes at two different levels have to be considered.
Additionally, the way of financing the subsidiary plays a role. In the main analysis, we
assume that the parent company finances the subsidiary solely by new equity in order to
reduce complexity.51
The earnings of the investment are taxed at the level of the subsidiary at first. The
after-tax profits at the level of the subsidiary are then distributed to the parent company by
means of dividend payments. This repatriation might lead to an additional tax burden at
the level of the parent company. Here, we consider withholding taxes levied by the source
country and the way the residence country taxes the repatriated profits, i.e. how it avoids
51 We account for other financing possibilities (retained earnings, debt) in the robustness section 4.4.2.
The parent company itself is refinanced by 100% equity.
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double taxation on foreign-source dividends.52 If the exemption method applies, the tax
level of the source (foreign) country always prevails for the model investment. In that case,
the corporate tax level in the residence country does not matter.
This gives multinationals incentives to take foreign countries’ taxes into account when
deciding about an investment’s location. However, minimizing the tax burden of an in-
vestment by optimizing the location decision is restricted when CFC rules apply. In that
case, taxes on the profits of a foreign subsidiary are calculated according to the tax law of
the parent’s country. A relief mechanism for the tax paid in the foreign country may be
granted in order to avoid double taxation. We consider the possibility that CFC rules apply
in the following.
The Devereux-Griffith model computes the EATR for both domestic and cross-border
investments. Basically, a cross-border investment from home country H to source country
S will bear a tax burden of EATRcbH,S (superscript ‘cb’ denotes cross-border). To determine
whether the CFC rules of H apply for a cross-border investment into S, we need to compare
the domestic tax burdens of H (EATRdomH ) and S (EATR
dom
S ). CFC rules apply if the tax
burden of an investment in S is lower than the required minimum level of taxation as defined
by the CFC rules of H. The minimum level of taxation is determined by a country-specific
relative threshold THRH which relates EATR
dom
H and EATR
dom
S .
53 THRH ranges from
50% to 75% in the EU. Formally, a residence country will apply its CFC rules if
EATRdomS < EATR
dom
H · THRH (4.1)
52 In the EU, double taxation is avoided by the provisions of the parent-subsidiary directive which requires,
firstly, the abolishment of withholding taxes and, secondly, the residence country to apply either the
exemption or the credit method.
53 This is the condition for countries with relative thresholds. Germany, Greece and Hungary employ
absolute thresholds as shown in Table C.2 in the appendix.
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In this situation, the domestic tax rules of H are applied and the cross-border investment
is taxed as if it was a domestic investment in H. Generally, the investment bears at least
EATRdomH , as the domestic tax rules of H apply. In case H allows for a tax credit for the taxes
paid in S, the final tax burden for the cross-border investment exactly equals EATRdomH .
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Therefore, the final tax burden for a cross-border investment under the consideration of CFC
rules (EATRcb,CFCH,S ) can be written as
EATRcb,CFCH,S =

EATRcbH,S if EATR
dom
S ≥ EATRdomH · THRH
EATRdomH if EATR
dom
S < EATR
dom
H · THRH
(4.2)
If no double taxation relief is granted, the tax burden for the cross-border investment equals
the sum of EATRdomH and EATR
dom
S .
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4.3.2 Scenarios
For a comprehensive analysis of the Cadbury Schweppes decision’s effect on the tax neutrality
in the EU, we look at both member states’ adjustments to their CFC rules as demanded by
the ECJ and the introduction of new low-tax regimes (IP boxes) in some member states. As
argued in section 4.1, the introduction of IP boxes for acquired patents has to be analyzed
in the context of the restriction of CFC rules enforced by the ECJ, since this enhanced the
effectiveness of the IP box.
In total, we distinguish four different scenarios which are inclined to allow conclusions
on the ECJ’s effect on economic neutrality within the internal market:
1. CFC–, IP–: CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes do not exist
2. CFC+, IP–: CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes do not exist
54 If CFC rules apply, the taxes paid in S are by definition always lower than the tax burden in H.
Therefore, the taxes paid in S can be fully credited.
55 This is the case in Hungary and Iceland. For the deduction method which is applied in Spain, the tax
burden in the CFC case can be approximated by EATRdomS + EATR
dom
H − EATRdomS · EATRdomH .
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3. CFC–, IP+: CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes exist
4. CFC+, IP+: CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes exist
To identify the situations which correspond most with an efficient allocation of resources as
stipulated by the European treaties, we rely on concepts that have been employed in previous
studies. Devereux and Pearson (1995) analyze the impact of hypothetical corporate tax har-
monisation reforms in the EU on production efficiency. Likewise, the European Commission
(2001) examines economic inefficiencies induced by corporate taxes in the EU and simulates
various hypothetical tax reforms. Elschner et al. (2011) evaluate how economic neutrality
has changed over time in the EU. In principle, these studies analyze two dimensions: First,
they investigate by how much domestic tax burdens differ from cross-border tax burdens.
And second, they show how much cross-border tax burdens vary depending on the source
country in case of an outbound investment and the residence country in case of an inbound
investment.
With respect to outbound investments, a (parent) corporation can choose to invest in 30
different countries in our setting.56 In an idealized tax-neutral world, all outbound EATRs
would be the same, i.e. the standard deviation of the EATRs of all investment location
possibilities would be zero. Furthermore, the outbound EATRs would exactly equal the
domestic EATR of the parent country. This would constitute an efficient allocation of re-
sources across countries and so-called capital export neutrality (CEN) would be fulfilled. In
this case, the pre-tax rates of return for the investment projects of the same investor are
identical. Thus, no overall output increase can be achieved by reallocating capital from one
country to another.
In terms of inbound investments, there is an additional notion of efficiency, namely capital
import neutrality (CIN). This concept ensures that different international investors in a
specific country face the same after-tax rate of return for investments carried out in this
56 We consider the 28 EU member states as well as the EEA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
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country. Therefore, CIN ensures that domestic capital and inbound capital compete on an
equal basis within a country. This is the case when all possible 30 inbound investments into
a country bear the same tax burden and when this tax burden equals the one of domestic
investors. Technically, the first condition is fulfilled if the EATR’s standard deviation for
inbound investments equals zero.
We focus on both neutrality concepts, CIN and CEN, similar to previous economic studies
(e.g. Devereux and Pearson, 1995; Elschner et al., 2011). This reflects the aim of an optimal
international tax structure in general and a level playing field in the EU in particular.57
Devereux (1993) and Devereux and Pearson (1995) show that it needs both CEN and CIN
to achieve production efficiency. The ECJ’s jurisprudence broadly corresponds to these
concepts insofar as it aims at eliminating discriminatory measures for both outbound and
inbound investments (e.g. Graetz and Warren Jr, 2012; Scho¨n, 2015). However, due to
general differences in the member states’ tax levels and their diverse reactions to the court’s
rulings, it is unclear if the ECJ’s approach of removing discriminatory measures indeed leads
to a more level playing field in the EU (De La Feria and Fuest, 2016).
4.4 Results
In this section we present the results for the four different scenarios with respect to both
domestic and cross-border EATRs for the years 2004, 2007, 2010 and 2014. These years
reflect the situations before and after the ECJ’s judgement in 2006 as well as the increasing
relevance of IP box regimes in recent years. As argued before, this allows us to take into
account the medium- and long-run effects of the ECJ’s approach.
57 The concepts of CEN and CIN have been introduced by Musgrave (1969).
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4.4.1 Main results
CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes do not exist (Scenario 1)
The first scenario serves as a baseline scenario which disregards CFC rules and IP box
regimes. This allows quantifying and disentangling the influence of CFC rules and IP boxes
later on. Furthermore, it reflects the analyses of previous studies which, however, look at
more general investments (Spengel et al., 2015).
Table 4.1 shows the detailed results for all countries for the years 2004 and 2014. In most
countries, the domestic EATR decreases from 2004 to 2014.58 Overall, the (unweighted)
mean domestic EATR decreases from 25.57% in 2004 to 21.69% in 2014. The standard
deviation of domestic EATRs decreases from 8.03 in 2004 to 7.70 percentage points in 2014
which indicates a slight convergence in national effective tax levels.
For the cross-border investments, results for the level in EATRs are presented in columns
3 to 6 of Table 4.1. The outbound columns (column 3 and 4) contain all possible outbound
locations (i.e. subsidiaries) for a given residence country. This is attained by computing
the average over all possible investment locations (30 countries) for a parent company. On
the other hand, the inbound columns (column 5 and 6) contain all possible parent locations
for a given investment location (i.e. subsidiary). More precisely, we compute the average
inbound EATR over all the residence countries for a given source country for the years
2004 and 2014. Analogously to the domestic results, the average outbound and inbound
EATRs decline for the vast majority of countries from 2004 to 2014. This is also reflected
in the mean figures over all countries (bottom row in Table 4.1): The mean of the average
inbound and outbound EATRs decreases from 29.62% in 2004 to 22.97% in 2014. When
relating this to national investments, the discrepancy in tax burdens between domestic and
cross-border investments turns out to decline significantly to only 1.28 percentage points in
58 This is in line with previous studies which find a declining trend in effective tax burdens in the EU.
See, e.g., Elschner et al. (2011) and Endres et al. (2013).
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2014 compared to 4.05 percentage points in 2004. This indicates a move towards a more
level playing field in the internal market which does not discriminate between domestic and
cross-border investments. However, the average inbound and outbound EATRs of the single
countries (column 3-6 in Table 4.1) as well as the means over these averages (bottom row of
Table 4.1) mask substantial heterogeneity.
The non-zero standard deviations for in- and outbound investments on a country level
(column 7-10 in Table 4.1) indicate substantial differences of cross-border tax burdens de-
pending on the location of the parent and the subsidiary. If CEN held, the standard deviation
of outbound investments for a given residence country would be zero (column 8 in Table 4.1
for the year 2014). Consequently, also the mean over these standard deviations should be
zero (bottom row of Table 4.1). Similarly, if CIN held, the standard deviation of inbound
investments for a given source country would be zero (column 10 in Table 4.1 for the year
2014).
Clearly, CIN and CEN are not fulfilled in 2014 given the non-zero standard deviations for
cross-border investments. The mean standard deviation for outbound investments slightly
increases from 7.38 in 2004 to 7.78 percentage points in 2014 (bottom of column 7 and
8). At the same time, the mean standard deviation for inbound investments significantly
decreases from 5.96 to 3.89 (bottom of column 9 and 10). Taking both neutrality concepts
into account, this constitutes a clear strengthening of CIN over time whereas economic
distortions for outbound investments remain roughly constant.
These domestic and cross-border figures can be explained by mainly two trends in national
and international tax legislation in the EU. First, a general decline of the corporate income
tax rates can be observed for almost all countries and especially for countries with initially
high tax rates in 2004.59 This does not only lead to lower and converging domestic EATRs
but also induces convergence in EATRs between domestic and cross-border investments.
59 See, e.g., Spengel et al. (2015, pp. A-1 - A-4).
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Second, the decline in cross-border EATRs can additionally be explained by the fact that
all countries with credit systems for foreign dividends have moved towards an exemption
system in recent years except for Ireland.60 This also explains the steady decline over time
of the inbound standard deviations because the cross-border tax burden is solely determined
by the source countries’ tax level in case of equity financing. However, domestic EATRs
have increased in a few high-tax countries (e.g. France and Portugal) during and after the
crisis due to their fiscal needs which explains why the mean of the standard deviations for
outbound investments picks up again from 2010 to 2014 (Table 4.2).61 This development
during the crisis is also reflected in the mean of domestic EATRs which does not experience
a further decline from 2010 to 2014.
In the following, we consider how cross-border EATRs differ when implementing the
other scenarios presented above. On the one hand, this is useful in order to identify and
quantify the effects of specific features of the tax systems (e.g. a lower statutory tax rate
on IP income). On the other hand, this serves to gather evidence on how helpful the ECJ’s
Cadbury Schweppes decision was in moving closer to an internal market. We present the
summarizing results of the different scenarios in Table 4.2 which shows the means of all
countries corresponding to the bottom row of Table 4.1.
CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes do not exist (Scenario 2)
In the second scenario, we assume CFC rules to be in place when computing the EATRs.
This allows isolating the general impact of CFC rules on tax neutrality in the EU given
the national tax systems in place. The qualitative analysis with regard to CFC rules in
section 4.2.1.3 shows that most of the countries enacted an exception clause as a reaction
to the court’s ruling. Such an exception clause excludes all EU states from the CFC rules’
60 The last countries that changed their systems to the exemption method were the United Kingdom in
2010 and Greece in 2011. See Spengel et al. (2015, p. A-23).
61 Seven countries increased their corporate income tax rate from 2010 to 2014 which is in contrast to the
development in previous years. See Spengel et al. (2015, pp. A-1 - A-4).
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Table 4.2: Development of EATR for domestic and cross-border investments for different
scenarios
Year EATRdom EATRout SD(EATRoutH,S) EATR
inb SD(EATRinbH,S)
Scenario 1: CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes do not exist:
2004 25.57 29.62 7.38 29.62 5.96
2007 23.13 25.79 7.58 25.79 5.25
2010 22.00 23.58 7.45 23.58 4.16
2014 21.69 22.97 7.78 22.97 3.89
Scenario 2: CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes do not exist:
2004 25.57 30.27 6.67 30.27 6.09
2007 23.13 26.64 7.06 26.64 5.85
2010 22.00 24.75 6.67 24.75 5.15
2014 21.69 24.23 7.16 24.23 5.29
Scenario 3: CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes exist:
2004 24.59 28.81 8.02 28.81 6.14
2007 21.95 24.73 8.39 24.73 5.44
2010 18.96 20.67 8.66 20.67 4.44
2014 18.03 19.65 9.07 19.65 4.36
Scenario 4: CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes exist:
2004 24.59 29.47 7.39 29.47 6.37
2007 21.95 25.62 7.77 25.62 6.08
2010 18.96 22.29 7.42 22.29 5.82
2014 18.03 21.36 7.69 21.36 5.89
Note: EATRdom corresponds to the (unweighted) average of the 31 country-specific EATRdom. Each
country faces 30 outbound and inbound possibilities. EATRout (EATRinb) is the mean over all out-
bound (inbound) EATRs (31 × 30= 930 cases). The two remaining columns show the mean standard
deviation over the 31 countries for outbound and inbound investments.
applicability in our investment setting. The scenario which we present now, however, neglects
the consequences of the judgement and assumes that CFC rules are still applicable in a
European context after 2006.62 This sheds light on the potential relevance of CFC rules over
time (given the real development of the domestic tax codes in the EU). Since the applicability
of CFC rules depends on the relative difference between domestic and foreign tax levels, CFC
rules are likely to play a smaller role in a situation with converging national tax levels.
62 Only CFC rules with a “threshold approach” (low taxation condition) will be regarded. Therefore,
Finland, Hungary, Italy (2004-2009) and Sweden are excluded. Additionally, Spain is not regarded
either, as royalty income has not been defined as CFC income until 2015. The robustness section and
Table C.4 in the appendix contain results for an extended scenario in which we assume that the CFC
rules of these countries are also applicable.
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The results for scenario 2 are shown in Table 4.2. Clearly, the mean standard deviation
of inbound investments (SD(EATRinbH,S)) is higher when CFC rules apply compared to when
they do not apply (scenario 1) and the difference is considerably increasing over time.63
More precisely, the difference in the standard deviation is increasing from 0.13 in 2004 to
1.40 percentage points in 2014. This result is related to the general trend towards exemption
systems which make the impact of CFC rules more pronounced.
If CFC rules apply, the cross-border investment usually bears the same tax burden as
the domestic investment in the residence country. Thus, from a source county’s perspective,
inbound investments bear very different tax burdens depending on the residence country of
the parent. This causes SD(EATRinbH,S) to be high. Conversely, the mean standard deviation
of outbound investments (SD(EATRoutH,S)) decreases slightly when CFC rules are in place in
all years. Taken together, CFC rules in the EU slightly strengthen CEN and clearly harm
CIN. Furthermore, CFC rules lead to a further divergence between the mean domestic tax
level (EATRdom) and the mean cross-border tax level (EATRout and EATRinb, respectively)
in all years.
CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes exist (Scenario 3)
In the third scenario, we consider the emergence of IP box regimes in the EU. IP box
regimes differ with respect to their scope of application as discussed in section 4.2.2. In our
simulation, we focus on IP box regimes which include acquired patents in order to reflect the
model investment into a patent. This scenario is of interest for at least two reasons: First,
it reflects the real tax legislation for the years after 2006. Therefore, the scenario provides
more accurate effective tax measures for IP investments than usually provided. Second, it
enables us to assess the ECJ’s ruling as well as possible reform options when comparing it
to the other scenarios.
63 Table C.3 in the appendix contains a detailed overview on the number of countries for which CFC rules
apply according to our computations.
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A priori, the effect of the IP box regimes on tax neutrality is ambiguous and not pre-
dictable. For example, France can be generally classified as a high tax country (applying
a main corporate tax rate of 41.93% in 2014) which clearly deviates from the mean EU
tax level. The IP box tax rate of 21.34% (2014) puts France’s tax level more in line with
EU standards. In contrast, Cyprus which generally represents a low tax jurisdiction (main
corporate tax rate of 12.5% in 2014) further lowers its tax level to an IP box tax rate of
2.5%. This constitutes a move away from the mean EU tax level. Therefore, it is not clear
whether the emergence of IP boxes in some countries leads to more or less tax alignment
and neutrality in the internal market.
The empirics in Table 4.2 show that the scenario at hand (CFC-/IP+) performs worse
than the baseline scenario (CFC-/IP-) with respect to both CIN and CEN. In 2014,
SD(EATRoutH,S) is 1.29 percentage points and SD(EATR
inb
H,S) 0.47 percentage points higher
when considering IP boxes compared to not considering them. This shows that the current
IP box regimes do not foster convergence between member states’ tax levels but, in contrast,
amplify differences in effective tax burdens. However, IP boxes lower the mean domestic
EATR significantly to only 18.03% and the one of cross-border investments to 19.65%.
CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes exist (Scenario 4)
In the fourth scenario, we additionally assume CFC rules to be in place. Put differently,
we model the hypothetical case of reintroducing CFC rules in today’s tax environment. From
Scenario 3 we know that the emergence of IP box regimes is detrimental for CIN and CEN,
at least when there are no CFC rules in place. The results of the scenario at hand show that
CFC rules are not the perfect solution to overcome the negative effects which IP boxes have
on tax neutrality. SD(EATRinbH,S) is significantly higher (5.89 compared to 3.89 percentage
points) than in the baseline scenario (no IP boxes and no CFC rules). With respect to
CEN, the reintroduction of CFC rules in 2014 would lower SD(EATRoutH,S) only very little
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compared to the baseline scenario - and not at all in the years 2004 and 2007. Also, the
reintroduction of CFC rules would lead to a divergence of the mean domestic and mean
cross-border EATR.
4.4.2 Robustness of results
The results presented in the previous sections are based on specific assumptions on the
applicability of CFC rules as well as on the pre-tax return and the financing of the investment
in the model. In the following, we conduct sensitivity analyses for these three dimensions.
In a first sensitivity analysis, we check how our results change when relaxing the assumptions
for the application of CFC rules. So far, we have taken a rather strict stance on the scope
of applicability and excluded countries which follow a jurisdictional approach. Therefore,
we have not considered the CFC rules of Finland, Hungary, Italy, Spain and Sweden in our
computations. Table C.4 in the appendix shows that our main results remain unchanged
when the CFC rules of these countries are considered. The negative effect of IP boxes on
CEN and CIN is more pronounced when more countries apply CFC rules.64
The EATRs calculated in the previous sections rely on the assumption that the investment
yields a pre-tax return of 20%. However, the EATRs are sensitive to changes in the pre-tax
return. In particular, they align with the statutory tax rate for very high pre-tax returns
(see, e.g., Devereux and Griffith, 1999, p. 22; Schreiber et al., 2002, p. 16). Conversely, for
low pre-tax returns, the determination of the tax base (tax depreciation rules) plays a more
important role. Tables C.6 and C.7 in the appendix show the results for pre-tax returns of
15% and 25%. For a pre-tax return of 15% (25%), the EATRs are generally lower (higher) and
the standard deviations for outbound and inbound investments are higher (lower) compared
to a pre-tax return of 20%. The main results are still valid: The introduction of IP boxes
64 Table C.5 in the appendix contains a detailed overview concerning the number of CFC rules triggered
by low taxation levels.
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led to a deterioration of CEN as well as CIN and a reintroduction of CFC rules cannot be
recommended.
As a third robustness test, the assumption that the subsidiary is entirely financed by new
equity is relaxed. Additional financing possibilities might especially be relevant for cross-
border investments from low-tax residence to high-tax source countries. In these situations,
financing the subsidiary by debt is more beneficial compared to new equity or retained
earnings. For robustness, we present results which only consider the most tax efficient
source of financing. For this, we compute separate EATRs for each financing option of an
investment and choose the most beneficial option. The results in Table C.8 in the appendix
show that our main conclusions remain valid. However, the EATRs and the cross-border
standard deviations are lower in all scenarios than in the baseline computations. This is due
to the aforementioned beneficial debt financing of subsidiaries in high-tax countries.
4.5 Summary
Our paper demonstrates possible negative effects of the ECJ’s jurisprudence on the internal
market by analyzing the consequences of the Cadbury Schweppes decision. We use the well-
known concepts of capital export and capital import neutrality to measure the impact of the
judgement on international tax neutrality in Europe. The calculations with the Devereux-
Griffith model enable us to disentangle specific features of the tax systems and assess their
impact on tax neutrality in the internal market. Interpretations should be drawn cautiously,
though, since counterfactual scenarios are run in a ceteris paribus fashion. Without the ECJ’s
Cadbury Schweppes decision, CFC rules would still be in place today and the emergence of
IP boxes for acquired patents would have been discouraged. In this counterfactual scenario,
we observe an improvement over time in capital import neutrality and only a very slight
decrease in capital export neutrality.
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The real world scenario (de-facto abolishment of CFC rules and emergence of IP boxes)
describes the consequences of the Cadbury Schweppes decision in 2006. Our results do
not show a clear dominance of this scenario in comparison to the prejudgement scenario.
This dominance would be apparent in an improvement for both capital export and capital
import neutrality. However, the judgement only fostered capital import neutrality. At the
same time, the increasing divergence of domestic EATRs due to the IP box regimes and
the non-applicability of CFC rules harmed capital export neutrality significantly. Therefore,
our analysis casts doubt on the assumed positive effects of the ECJ’s jurisprudence on the
neutrality in the internal market. Overall, further research is needed to relate and harmonise
economic and legal concepts of tax neutrality.
The paper and the modelled scenarios allow to assess reform options for CFC rules and
IP boxes which are currently discussed by the OECD and the EU. These considerations are
presented in the conclusions of this thesis (Chapter 6).
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5 Vetoing and Inaugurating Policy Like Others Do:
Evidence on Spatial Interactions in Voter Initiatives
5.1 Introduction
A sizeable literature in economics and political science studies the question of how strategic
interactions among political jurisdictions affect their choice of public policies. Such inter-
actions may occur horizontally or vertically and between or within countries, in general,
because of learning, coercion, fiscal and yardstick competition. The fields of public finance
and public economics have put forward several mechanisms that underlie such spatial re-
lationships in the governments’ spending and taxing decisions (Revelli, 2005) and in other
public sector policies (Brueckner, 2003).
According to the externality mechanism, a government may find it optimal to internalize
a policy set by another government, say in the field of education or health care, when mak-
ing its own decision to build more or less schools and hospitals (Case et al., 1993). More
generally, local state capacity building can be a strategic choice for jurisdictions when their
borders are open (Acemoglu et al., 2015). A particular economic constraint may be due
to the competition for attracting mobile resources such as labor and capital through fiscal
competition (Tiebout, 1956; Wilson, 1999). In a principal-agent framework with incomplete
information a decision-maker is additionally subject to yardstick competition. Such compe-
tition arises if the principals form certain expectations in regard to their jurisdiction’s (not
perfectly observable) performance, for example in the quality of public service provision, by
relying on other jurisdictions’ (again not perfectly observable, but comparable) performance
as a yardstick (Besley and Case, 1995). Furthermore, representatives may learn from neigh-
bor’s policies and take them into account accordingly (see, e.g., Gilardi, 2010, for learning
between OECD countries). Based on theoretical models of policy choice, Volden et al. (2008)
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formalize such learning-based policy-diffusion mechanisms and Mukand and Rodrik (2005)
conceptualize the related idea of policy experimentation.
The outcomes of these often competing mechanisms can be similar, however with quite
different implications for policy makers. Therefore, significant effort has been put to disen-
tangle these mechanisms (Shipan and Volden, 2008), particularly with an empirical strategy
of comparing sub-national jurisdictions within countries (Brueckner, 2003). However, what
this literature has in common is that it almost exclusively focuses on economic systems
based on a pure representative form of government. Our paper contributes to this literature
by studying political systems where decisions can be made also directly by voters through
initiatives or other direct democratic instruments. The basic idea is that the voters’ ac-
tions in vetoing a decision or inaugurating a preferred policy by a binding initiative in their
jurisdiction may potentially have spillover effects on the (direct democratic) actions of voters.
Theoretically, the proposed channel can be thought of (groups of) voters as collective
decision-makers interacting with each other similar to individuals in the social interactions
analysis (Manski, 2000). Of course, voters do have a role to play in a representative system,
where, for example, they can “vote with their feet” affecting competition and the implied
interactions. Voters can also influence political decisions outside of elections, such as through
popular mobilization. In fact, a large literature in political science and sociology argues that
such instances of collective action do not take place in isolation, but are often the result
of significant spillovers across time and jurisdictions (Snow et al., 2004). Relatedly, our
argument is that direct democracy provides a new and legitimate decision-making institution
which may or may not be mimicked across jurisdiction. This is the central question we aim
to test in this paper.
Regarding the relevance of this question, most of the previous empirical contributions on
spatial interaction in public policies concentrate on higher income countries with some level
of autonomy in sub-national governance. Many of these countries by now have some kind of
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direct democratic institutions at the local level, therefore testing the proposed question of
interactions through direct decision-making mechanisms seems timely.
Regarding the empirical design, a central concern with the observed spatial patterns
in jurisdictions’ policies has been the empirical difficulties in isolating possible common
shocks or spatially correlated (unobservable) effects from the real effects of interest (Gibbons
and Overman, 2012). Several recent papers rely on arguably more credible identification
techniques by utilizing sources of exogenous variation (see, e.g., Lyytika¨inen, 2012; Isen,
2014; Baskaran, 2014, 2015), and find that some of the previously documented strong effects
could be due to spurious correlations.
Our design focuses on German municipalities from 2002 to 2014, where since the mid-
1990s citizens have the power to veto (some of) local governments’ decisions and propose
certain new policies by launching initiatives (in total around 3,200 for the 13,000 munici-
palities in the study period). We apply spatial reaction functions, and exploit a plausibly
exogenous instrument based on the states’ differences in direct democratic laws to identify
interactions between municipalities. Following Asatryan (2016), our main instrument for the
number of initiatives in the neighboring municipalities is the amount of signatures required
for the initiative to be successful. We use municipality fixed effects to control for unobserved
constant spatial correlation across municipalities.
Our findings suggest that the probability of observing an initiative in a municipality is
positively driven by its neighbors’ activity in direct democracy. The results indicate that a
one standard deviation increase in the average number of neighbor initiatives increases the
probability of having an initiative by 2.13%. This effect is statistically significant over time,
and is stronger in towns with relatively more information flows (measured by local newspaper
consumption of citizens and total number of commuters across jurisdictions). Additionally,
we find evidence that the results are driven by spillovers in similar policy areas. Moreover,
our results are robust to various placebo tests.
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To put into context, this paper is related to the literature explaining (the extent of)
spatial interactions by certain political-economy factors in general, and from the repre-
sentative versus direct democracy angle in particular. In the theoretical framework of
Hugh-Jones (2009) interactions may exist either for policy experimentation (citizens them-
selves observe the effects of policy) which is possible only in a direct democratic system,
or for yardstick competition in representative systems. The theoretical paper by Boehmke
(1999) argues that interactions can be more intensive between jurisdictions that have direct
democratic systems compared to representative democracies, but this is explained primar-
ily by informational advantages of the former system. In contrast, the empirical study of
Schaltegger and Ku¨ttel (2002) with Swiss data argues that direct democracy (and fiscal au-
tonomy) significantly increases the level of political competition and, therefore, reduces the
scope of policy mimicking. The authors, however, do not analyze the channel that we pro-
pose here – that is the potential scope for spillovers through direct democratic institutions.
Also, the focus is on referendums, thus, only on the veto-power of direct democracy, while
the agenda-setting function of initiatives, which may actually enhance the policy space and
not the opposite, is neglected. Hawley and Rork (2015) study spatial determinants of the
property tax limit overrides in Massachusetts and demonstrate that a town’s likelihood of
holding an initial vote increases by 10-15% if a neighboring town has already held a vote
at some point in the past. This evidence combined with our findings reinforce the result
of strong spatial interactions in direct democratic instruments in two different settings. In
contrast to our paper, however, the focus of Hawley and Rork (2015) is again on referen-
dums called by the government, which only allows studying government-level interactions.
Furthermore, the referendums analyzed by Hawley and Rork (2015) are about a specific
topic (i.e. the property tax limits) whereas our study covers a broader range of policy issues.
Finally, Arnold et al. (2015) study the effect of citizen-initiatives on housing supply in the
context of the German state Bayern. In order to estimate causal effects, they use a spatial lag
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of neighbor citizen-initiatives as an instrument for a municipality’s likelihood of launching
an initiative. Their first stage regressions are in line with our second stage results.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 briefly introduces the German institutions
of direct democracy and presents some anecdotal evidence on spillover mechanisms. Sec-
tion 5.3 describes our data and identification strategy, and Section 5.4 presents the results.
Conclusions are discussed in Section 5.5.
5.2 Institutions and spillover mechanisms
5.2.1 Germany’s local direct democratic institutions
Most German states (in German: La¨nder) introduced local-level direct democratic institu-
tions in the 1990s after the German re-unification. Baden-Wu¨rttemberg is an exception with
institutions of direct democracy on the local level already established in 1956. Berlin is the
last state which introduced laws of direct democracy in 2005.
These institutions enable citizens to launch so-called citizen initiatives (“Bu¨rger-
begehren”) which are divided into innovative initiatives (“Initiativbegehren”) and corrective
initiatives (“Korrekturbegehren”). The latter is used to veto on policies which have been
adopted by the city council, while the former allows to launch new policies. For an initiative
to be successfully implemented the initiators face several constrains. First, a town-specific
amount of signatures has to be collected (minimum signature requirement) within a prede-
fined time. If this is achieved, the city council will decide if it wants to realize the issue at
hand or not. In case of a negative decision, the next step of the procedure is reached, i.e.
citizens vote on the respective issue. Besides a simple majority, some states further require a
certain quorum (minimum turnout relative to population) for the vote to be accepted. An-
other limitation are topic exclusions: topics which directly concern the municipal budgets are
not allowed for initiatives in any state (fiscal taboo). Moreover, each state has a list of other
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prohibited topics (off-limits issues) or a list of allowed topics (positive catalogue). All states
except Bayern and Bremen also demand initiatives to be accompanied by a cost-recovery
proposal.65
Looking into the data we observe a higher activity of direct democracy in states with less
strict institutions. For example, in Bayern, where there are comparatively liberal institutions,
around 2,700 initiatives have been launched until 2015. On the contrary, in Baden-Wu¨rt-
temberg, where very rigorous regulations are in place, only around 800 initiatives have been
launched until 2015.66 The geographical distribution of the number of initiatives is illus-
trated in a heat-map in Figure D.1 of the appendix. Table D.1 summarizes the state-level
institutions of direct democracy.
5.2.2 Anecdotal evidence and diffusion processes
With these direct democratic institutions in place, the argument is that there is an additional
mechanisms at the hands of voters which may be used to (ban) mimic (non-)preferred policies
across jurisdictions.67 Anecdotal evidence from the following cases helps to better understand
the idea.
The construction of a new railway station in the city of Stuttgart is an example for direct
democratic activity being contagious across jurisdictions. The so-called Stuttgart 21 project
calls for deconstructing two wings of a century-old train station, and replacing above-ground
tracks with a tunnel system which is supposed to speed up travel times. However, there have
been several initiatives which all aimed at stopping the project.68 This direct democratic
65 For more detailed information on the history of German institutions of direct democracy see, e.g.,
Asatryan (2016) and Rehmet et al. (2014).
66 One of the regulations concern the number of signatures required for an initiative to be successful.
Arnold and Freier (2015) and Asatryan et al. (2016) show that the signature requirement affects the
number of initiatives.
67 In practice, these possible interactions can not only occur by mimicking of initiatives but also by less
formal means, for example by demonstrations or informal initiatives. In a sense, our results therefore
constitute a lower bound estimate for spillover effects in direct democratic activity of citizens.
68 In 2010, protests against this long-term project accumulated in large demonstrations. See for example
an article published in the New York Times:
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engagement by the population appears to have had spillover effects on the citizens of other
municipalities, for example, in the close-by town of Leonberg where citizens launched an
initiative in the same year against the demolition of a public indoor swimming pool and the
related plans of building a new swimming pool. One of the initiators of the initiative explicitly
stated that their activities have been inspired by the Stuttgart 21 opposition.69 Besides
learning about the possibility of conducting initiatives, this case illustrates an additional
notion of learning, namely learning about specific (optimal) policies.
A similar observation can be made for two other close-by municipalities, Denklingen and
Seefeld in the state of Bayern. In Denklingen, there was a long-standing discussion whether
to build a new city hall, or to renovate and extend the old one. This led to an initiative
against building a new city hall which was accompanied by many newspaper articles about
the topic.70 Shortly afterwards, a very similar discussion arose in Seefeld which then also
led to an initiative.
These observations are related to the mechanisms described by the literature on diffusion
processes within and across movements.71 Proximal models stipulate that actors mimic
strategies of other people or groups which are spatially or culturally important to them
(e.g. Soule, 1995, and Soule, 1997, in the context of student movements). In these settings,
diffusion is promoted by direct and indirect channels. Direct channels refer to the existence
of frequent contacts between the actors or even their overlapping engagement in more than
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/world/europe/06germany.html?_r=0 A version of this
article appeared in print on October 6, 2010, on page A11 of the New York edition with the headline:
Germany Pulls Back on Demolition of Stuttgart Rail Station.
69 For example in the regional newspaper “Stuttgarter Nachrichten”, which serves subscribers in both
municipalities Stuttgart and Leonberg: http://www.stuttgarter-zeitung.de/inhalt.
buerger-begehren-die-sanierung-des-sportzentrums.
4c32408a-5936-44dd-93b8-5bef9a6a138b.html
70 For example, see the following reports from two regional newspapers which cover both municipalities:
http://www.augsburger-allgemeine.de/landsberg/
754-Unterschriften-fuer-Rathaus-Stopp-id28639427.html or http://www.kreisbote.de/
lokales/landsberg/buergerentscheid-ueber-rathaus-stopp-3354717.html.
71 Please see Snow et al. (2004) in general, and Soule’s contribution in this book in particular for a summary
on the diffusion research in the field of social movements.
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one movement. These direct channels might also occur in the case of direct democracy when,
for example, special interest groups spread to close-by municipalities. However, it is also well
possible that diffusion takes place by more indirect channels like media coverage (and the
consequent informational flows between voters) as described by Snow et al. (2004, p. 295).
In the context of race riots in the US, for example, Myers (2000) finds that wider media
coverage increases the penetration of riots in neighboring areas. Similarly, Revelli (2008)
shows that voters compare their jurisdiction’s performance with jurisdictions they share the
same local media with. We take such indirect channels into account and test if information
flows play a role in mimicking direct democratic activity.
As explained above, initiatives in German towns may address different fields of public
policies. Therefore, our empirical setup allows to test not only whether there are spillovers
in direct democratic engagement, but also whether these spillovers are solely driven by
initiatives within similar policy areas. Parallels can again be drawn with the government-
level interaction channels. If governments search for better policies because of yardstick and
fiscal competition due to voters looking across borders or threatening to exit, the question
is why voters themselves cannot directly implement such policies when direct democratic
rights are available.
Following the theoretical arguments and the anecdotal evidence discussed in the intro-
duction and this section, we arrive to the main hypothesis of this work: Complementing a
representative system of local governance with some institutions of direct democracy may
open a new channel of policy-spillovers across jurisdictions that functions through inter-
actions between (groups of) voters and their actions in exploiting their direct democratic
rights. The next sections proceed to a formal analysis of this hypothesis.
95
5.3 Data and specification
Our data consists of an unbalanced panel of over 13,000 German municipalities across all
German states for the years from 2002 to 2014 except of the city states Berlin, Bremen and
Hamburg.72 Table D.1 of the appendix summarizes the data on: state-level institutions of
direct democracy,73 municipality-level data on the frequency of observed initiatives as our
dependent variable, and a number of control variables (unemployment rate, population, the
share of population above 65 years old, and the sum of the vote shares for the Green Party
(Bu¨ndnis90/Die Gru¨nen), the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Left Party (Die Linke)
in the federal elections (denoted by “left share” hereafter)).
The paper tests for spillovers in direct democratic activity by specifying a reaction func-
tion (spatial lag model) similar to the approach employed by the literature on tax competition
and public budget spillovers (see, e.g., Devereux et al., 2008; Redoano, 2014; Foucault et al.,
2008).74 We specify the following linear probability model with municipality-panel fixed
effects in order to test if citizens mimic their direct democratic activities across jurisdictions:
d pit = δ
N∑
j 6=i
wjpjt +Xitβ2 + α2i + µ2t + ε2it (5.1)
where the dependent variable d pit is a dummy which is one if there was at least one
initiative launched by citizens of municipality i in year t. On the right hand side, Xit is the
set of standard demographic and political controls on municipality level mentioned above;
α2i is a municipality fixed effect, µ2t a year dummy, and ε2it an unobserved error term. The
72 We exclude these special “city states” since initiatives there are either implemented on the level of
the state (same as city) or district, both being different than municipalities. The panel is unbalanced
because of amalgamations of municipalities.
73 One of the main differences in direct democratic institutions are the amount of signatures which have
to be collected within a predefined time period in order to get to the next step of the direct democratic
process. This information is collected from states’ respective municipal codes.
74 More papers employing reaction functions are, e.g., Sole´-Olle´ (2001); Allers and Elhorst (2005); Leprince
et al. (2007); Bordignon et al. (2003); Buettner (2001); Hauptmeier et al. (2012); Davies and Voget
(2008); Devereux et al. (2008); Egger and Raff (2014); Overesch and Rincke (2011).
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spatial lag (
∑N
j=1wjpjt) constitutes the variable of interest which is the average number
of initiatives in the neighbor municipalities of i. The same weight wj is attached to each
neighbor municipality j of municipality i. We normalize the sum of these equal weights
to one, thus the spatial lag is simply the average number of initiatives in the neighbor
municipalities. In the main specification, municipalities within a 50 km radius of municipality
i qualify as neighbors. This reflects the idea that spillovers in direct democratic actions are
likely to be a rather regional phenomenon and that municipalities beyond 50 km may be
on average too far away for having an effect on municipality i, for example due to limited
information flows across regions.75 Consistently, we also exclude municipalities which are
close to a country border of Germany.76 For robustness, we vary the definition of neighbor
municipalities by varying the radius from 50 km to 30 km and 70 km, respectively.
Reaction functions like specified in equation (5.1) may be subject to a major endogeneity
concern: It is explicitly assumed that the likelihood of having an initiative in municipality i
depends on the average number of initiatives in municipality j and vice versa - this makes the
spatial lag endogenous by definition. The problem can be mitigated by applying appropriate
instruments to the spatial lag. The literature cited above on budget and tax-setting spillovers
uses the (weighted) averaged demographic and political control variables of the neighbor
municipalities to instrument the spatial lag. However, as argued recently by Baskaran (2014,
2015) this is no golden way out since this approach is not robust to possible common shocks
or spatially correlated (unobservable) effects.
75 With respect to direct exchange between individuals, Mok and Wellman (2007) show that distance
matters for interpersonal contact. Also, regional newspapers make up almost 75% of the total sales of
daily newspapers in Germany in 2014 (Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger e.V., 2015, p. 5).
These regional newspapers put a strong emphasis on regional news.
Similarly, the fiscal spillover literature also assumes geographically close jurisdictions to have a greater
effect on each other than more remote jurisdictions (e.g. Foucault et al. (2008) in the context of spending
interactions between French municipalities and Redoano (2014) with respect to tax competition among
European countries.)
76 We define closeness analogous to the respective neighborhood definition in the different specifications.
Border municipalities are not excluded in the spatial lag of municipalities not close to country borders.
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Following Asatryan (2016), we address this problem by relying on a plausibly exogenous
variable as our main instrument, namely the minimum requirement for the number of sig-
natures which have to be collected within a predefined time. The first-stage specification
therefore regresses the spatial lag on the averaged control variables of the neighbor munic-
ipalities (including the signature requirement) and all of the previous regressors and takes
the following form:
N∑
j 6=i
wjpjt = β
N∑
j 6=i
wjXjt +Xitβ1 + α1i + µ1t + ε1it (5.2)
Clearly, our main instrument, the signature requirement, is relevant for the frequency of
initiatives in a municipality (non-zero covariance between
∑N
j 6=iwjpjt and
∑N
j 6=iwjXjt). Fur-
thermore, the exogeneity condition is fulfilled since the signature requirement in municipality
j has no direct effect on the number of initiatives in municipality i (signature requirement in
j is uncorrelated with the error term of the second stage ε2it). This can be safely concluded
since the signature requirements are determined by state-laws and not by the municipali-
ties themselves and are, hence, exogenous to the single municipalities. Although set by the
states, the instrument does not only vary across states but also by municipalities within
states depending on population thresholds. It is measured in percent of a municipality’s
population and varies between 0.43% in a municipality in Sachsen-Anhalt and 15% in some
municipalities in Rheinland-Pfalz, Sachsen and Sachsen-Anhalt (see Table D.1).
To estimate our (second stage) specification we choose a linear probability model (LPM)
which allows for a binary dependent variable. The advantages of LPM prevail in our setting,
similar to Angrist and Pischke (2008) and Angrist (2001) who argue in favor of the LPM
instead of alternative models for which the conditions are likely not to be fulfilled. A probit
model would ensure that the fitted values fall between zero and one which is not always
the case with LPM; however, curve-fitting grounds and predictions are not decisive in our
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context (Angrist and Pischke, 2008, p.80). Furthermore, including fixed effects would make
probit estimates inconsistent (Ferne´ndez-Val, 2009). However, in our model it is crucial to
include municipality and time-fixed effects in order to control for unobserved time-invariant
municipality factors and common dynamics in direct democratic activity over time.77 There
is a crucial point why our identification strategy could fail if we were not including munici-
pality fixed effects: The signature requirement in municipality j could be correlated with the
initiatives in municipality i through a spatially correlated unobserved factor that determines
both the minimum signature requirement and initiatives. In particular, neighboring popula-
tion sizes (which determine the neighbors’ signature requirement) could be correlated with
spatially correlated unobservables that also affect initiatives in i. We mitigate this potential
endogeneity by including municipality-fixed effects.
There is another reason why we use LPM: Employing an instrumental variable approach
within the framework of non-linear models would lead to severe additional complexity.78
However, instrumenting the spatial lag is indispensible for not being taken in by spurious
correlation. Throughout our analysis, we cluster standard errors at the county level.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Main results
Our baseline second stage results are collected in Table 5.1. The main explanatory variable
of interest is the spatial lag, i.e. the average number of initiatives in neighbor municipalities
within a 50 km radius. As specified above, we instrument this spatial lag on the (state-
imposed) signature requirements and the covariates of the neighboring municipalities.
77 Bazzi and Blattman (2014) and Friedman and Schady (2013) also use LPM in order to be able to include
fixed effects.
78 Angrist and Pischke (2008, p. 80) also put this point forward when arguing in favor of LPM. Beck
(2011) discusses the trade-off between LPM and non-linear models.
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Table 5.1: Second stage effects of spillovers from neighbors’ initiatives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLE Citizen initiative dummy
Spatial lag (neighbor initiatives) in t 0.8714*** 0.6446*
(0.2691) (0.3599)
Spatial lag (neighbor initiatives) in t− 1 0.8838**
(0.4189)
Spatial lag (neighbor initiatives) in t− 2 0.9457**
(0.4014)
Spatial lag (neighbor initiatives) in t− 3 0.0363
(0.3263)
Signature requirement -0.1335 -0.1250 -0.1728* -0.2289**
(0.1067) (0.1089) (0.1000) (0.0911)
Ln population 0.0075 0.0072 0.0092 0.0062
(0.0064) (0.0077) (0.0106) (0.0153)
Unemployment rate 0.0435 0.0656** 0.0636* 0.0137
(0.0272) (0.0296) (0.0350) (0.0389)
Share of population over 65 0.0217 0.0118 0.0144 0.0000
(0.0292) (0.0308) (0.0323) (0.0352)
Left share -0.0033 -0.0093 -0.0207* -0.0253*
(0.0124) (0.0130) (0.0119) (0.0136)
Observations 101,673 100,481 90,766 80,992 71,164
Number of municipalities 9,944 9,939 9,716 9,432 8,897
Hansen-J p-value 0.570 0.747 0.488 0.189 0.236
Kleibergen-Paap F 18.19 10.54 13.67 18.76 21.18
Kleibergen-Paap LM 49.42 35.97 45.49 59.56 74.83
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The table presents results for the second stage estimation of the linear probability model
specified in equation 5.1. All regressions include time and municipal fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level.
The first stage results are reported in Table D.2 of the appendix. Our main instrument,
the signature requirement, is statistically significant and negative. This evidence of a negative
effect of signature requirements on direct democratic activity is consistent with the existing
literature (Arnold and Freier, 2015; Asatryan et al., 2016).
In Table 5.1 we report several tests for the validity of our specification and the strength
of our instruments. The Hansen-J overidentification test checks if the instruments are un-
correlated with the error term. All specifications show large p-values which imply that our
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instruments are valid. The Kleibergen-Paap LM underidentification statistic tests whether
the employed instruments are relevant, the null hypothesis being that they are irrelevant. In
addition, the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic tests for weak identification, the null hypothesis
being that instruments are weak.79 The results of the Kleibergen-Paap statistics show that
the instruments are sufficiently strong.
In the main results presented in Table 5.1, we obtain a significant and positive estimate
for the spatial lag of initiatives which is robust to a number of specifications. After controlling
for municipal characteristics and fixed effects, the probability of having an initiative in period
t increases significantly when the neighbors host more initiatives (column 2). In column 3-5
of Table 5.1 we substitute the contemporaneous spatial lag by the first, second and third
lagged values in order to study whether the spillover effects are persistent over time. Indeed,
we observe that the effects hold over time. Spillovers from initiatives one and two years
before appear to be even stronger than simultaneous spillovers. This is well possible given
the long process of starting an initiative, collecting signatures and, if successful, eventually
holding a vote. Also, knowledge about neighboring initiatives might not diffuse instantly
and communities might take their time to organize an initiative after observing initiatives
in neighbor municipalities. Consistently though, spillover effects vanish when moving even
further into the past (column 5).
For the second lag, the estimated coefficient is 0.96, which indicates that the probability
of having an initiative increases by 96 percentage points if – on average – all neighbor munic-
ipalities have one initiative more. Given that the average number of neighbor municipalities
is 460, this implies an unrealistic increase in the number of neigbor initiatives by 460. To
aid in interpretability, we compute results that show the effect of a one standard deviation
79 The test replaces the Cragg-Donald weak identification test in the case of heteroskedastic standard
errors.
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increase in the number of neighbor initiatives. A one standard deviation increase in neighbor
initiatives increases the probability of having an initiative by 2.13 percentage points.
5.4.2 Robustness of results
As robustness test, we depart from our neighborhood definition which considers munici-
palities within a radius of 50 km. First, we restrict the radius to 30 km and, second, we
increase the radius to 70 km (columns 1-8 in Table 5.2). For 30 km, the spatial lag again
is significantly positive and persistent over time. Also, the spillover effect fades out after
three periods. Compared to the 50 km baseline specifications, the economic effects – put
in relation to the standard deviation – are stronger for the 30 km specification. For the
second lag, a one standard deviation increase in the average number of neighbor petitions
increases the probability of having a petition by 2.77 percentage points. When increasing
the radius to 70 km, no spillover effects can be detected. This confirms that spillover effects
are regionally restricted, e.g. due to limited information flows across space, and that close-by
municipalities are more relevant for each other than further apart ones.
We additionally run a placebo test which generates random initiatives for all municipal-
ities and regresses them on the true spatial lags. For this, the placebo initiative dummy has
the same mean as the true initiative dummy. The results are reported in columns 9-12 in
Table 5.2. As expected, the spatial lags are all not significant.
As another placebo test we regress the initiative dummy on forwarded spatial lags. The
idea is that spillover effects from future initiatives on initiatives today cannot happen. As
expected, the effects are insignificant. In Figure D.2 we plot this placebo test together with
the effects from Table 5.1.80
80 The effect in t=1 corresponds to the spatial lag in t − 1, i.e. column 3 in Table 5.1, as we take the
neighborhood’s perspective in the graph and look how long it will take until the spillover effects happen.
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5.4.3 Extension of results
In this sub-section, we extend our main results by two important empirical tests to shed
more light on the spillover mechanisms. Firstly, we ask whether the spillovers are due
to learning about the possibility of holding initiatives or due to learning about specific
(optimal) policies. Secondly, we are interested to see whether informational channels – such
as newspaper circulation or direct personal contacts across municipalities – play a role in
these patterns of interactions as it is the case for the diffusion of movements (see section
5.2.2).
Up to now, we have demonstrated that all initiatives in the neighborhood positively affect
the likelihood of hosting any initiative. This result allows arguing that the use of direct
democratic instruments might have spillovers itself as voters learn about a new political tool
they can exercise in general.81
In Table 5.3 we advance a step further by dividing the initiatives into three main public
policy areas – traffic, economy and infrastructure – over which initiatives can be held. These
topics are by far the most frequent ones and jointly cover 83% of all initiatives. We then
estimate the baseline regressions with controls and fixed effects both within and across these
topics. Two out of three within-topic coeffcients reported on the diagonal of Table 5.3 show
significant effects. These results broadly support the hypothesis that the interaction effects
are largely driven by spillovers in specific public policies. We do not detect evidence for
spillovers across different topics.82
Next, we test whether the cross-municipal spillovers in initiatives are conditional on
the availability and exchange of information. One of the important spillover mechanisms we
81 Parallels can be drawn to the literature that studies the cross-border diffusion of democracy (Elkink,
2011), regime change (Brinks and Coppedge, 2006), and riots (Aidt and Franck, 2015).
82 Due to different topic restrictions depending on the respective municipal codes, there cannot be any
mimicking in some specific public policies across neighboring municipalities. Thus, in more homogeneous
settings than this one, the mimicking in direct democratic institutions would probably be higher.
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Table 5.4: Effects of spillovers from neighbors’ initiatives by number of newspapers per
household and commuters per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLE Citizen initiative dummy
local newspapers commuters p.c.
below median above median below median above median
Spatial lag (neighbor initiatives) 0.7041 1.1689*** 0.4290 0.8436*
(0.6145) (0.4409) (0.5886) (0.5073)
Signature requirement -0.1959 -0.0461 -0.0905 -0.2067**
(0.1407) (0.0734) (0.1203) (0.0951)
Ln population -0.0023 0.0114 -0.0026 0.0019
(0.0130) (0.0156) (0.0178) (0.0192)
Unemployment share 0.0293 0.0454 0.0426 0.0654
(0.0530) (0.0534) (0.0537) (0.0769)
Share of population over 65 0.0196 0.0142 0.0602 0.0670
(0.0476) (0.0566) (0.0578) (0.0700)
Left share -0.0205 -0.0210 -0.0619*** -0.0031
(0.0167) (0.0207) (0.0230) (0.0236)
Observations 37,093 37,109 37,006 36,906
Number of municipalities 3,787 3,637 7,209 6,210
Hansen-J p-value 0.272 0.793 0.763 0.377
Kleibergen-Paap F 19.11 14.50 6.375 27.27
Kleibergen-Paap LM 48.69 40.46 38.91 48.05
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The table presents second stage estimates of the linear probability model specified in
equation 5.1. All spatial lags contain municipalities within a radius of max. 50 km. We use the
spatial lag in t − 2. All regressions include time and municipal fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the county level.
have in mind is one that functions through popular media. Vetoing or inaugurating a certain
policy in one municipality may have the most impact on neighboring town’s voters when they
are sufficiently informed. To test this hypothesis we divide the municipalities according to
whether on a per household basis these purchase daily regional newspapers above or below
the median town. Regional newspapers are a primary source of information for citizens on
local issues.83 Results for the baseline specifications for the two sub-samples are collected in
83 We rely on the data on 2008’s newspaper circulation by Falck et al. (2014) which in turn rely on
data from the German Audit Bureau of Circulations (Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der
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Table 5.4 (column 1-2). Conditional on the town-size and a number of further controls, we
find robust evidence of significant spatial interactions in towns with above-median number
of newspapers but not for those with below-median newspapers.84 This exercise reveals that
information is one important transmission channel through which spillovers in initiatives
spread.
Finally, we test whether more direct channels of information diffusion play a role for
direct democratic activities having effects on neighbors. Direct channels refer to personal
contacts of citizens from different municipalities. To test this hypothesis we divide our
sample according to whether a municipality ‘hosts’ incoming commuters above or below the
median town.85 Results for the baseline specification for the two sub-samples are collected in
Table 5.4 (column 3-4). Conditional on the town-size and a number of further controls, we
find robust evidence of significant spatial spillovers into towns with above-median number
of commuters per capita but not for those with below-median commuters.86 This indicates
that direct channels of information diffusion between municipalities play a role for spillovers
in direct democracy.
5.5 Summary
To the best of our knowledge, previous literature has not yet tested or conceptualized the
proposed hypothesis that voters of related jurisdictions may mimic each others behavior
through the means of direct democracy. The channels of such interactions may be quite
different and complex, going from spillovers in specific policies to the process of learning
to exploit direct democratic rights. Further research on the behavior of individuals and,
Verbreitung von Werbetra¨gern , IVW, 2011). The data provides the annual number of daily newspapers
per household for each municipality in 2008.
84 The number of newspapers is not correlated with other variables that affect the probability of hosting an
initiative. Means and standard deviations of the control variables are similar for the two sub-samples.
85 We use commuters data from the Federal Statistical Office (“Regionaldatenbank”).
86 The number of commuters is not correlated with other variables that affect the probability of hosting an
initiative. Means and standard deviations of the control variables are similar for the two sub-samples.
107
especially, organized groups of individuals in the social interaction analysis may help to
shed more light into these and perhaps more interaction mechanisms. However, what this
analysis adds to the literature is that it is plausible that mimicking between jurisdictions takes
place not only through government-level interactions (learning, coercion, fiscal and yardstick
competition), but also through voters’ direct actions in vetoing and inaugurating policies
through binding-initiatives. Such interactions are, of course, conditional on the existence of
institutions of direct democracy, which are currently not any more rare especially in sub-
national levels of high-income countries.
If this reasoning is true, then it is important to recognize and quantify such interactions,
because direct democracy matters for policy-outcomes. Studies traditionally concentrating
on US and Switzerland, but more recently also extending to Germany and other countries,
find empirical support that direct democratic instruments affect policies in the public sector
in general, and fiscal decisions in particular (see, e.g., for the US Marschall and Ruhil, 2005;
and for Switzerland Feld and Matsusaka, 2003). For Germany, Asatryan et al., 2014 find that
direct democratic activity affects the level of local tax rates and changes their composition.
Although, we find evidence for spatial spillovers in initiatives, it is left to future work to
assess to what extent such mimicking behavior drives policy outcomes such as the level and
composition of taxes.
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6 Conclusions
This thesis studies different topics in the field of public economics and relies on various meth-
ods and data sources. The four chapters are in the areas of fiscal rules, tax competition, tax
neutrality and the European Court of Justice, and spillovers in direct democracy. While the
chapters are self-containing, they all emphasize the influence which (governmental) jurisdic-
tions have on each other. By focusing on different layers of government, the thesis hints to
parallelisms between the settings. The findings of the chapters have a number of relevant
policy implications which are discussed in the following.
Chapter 2 allows to draw two tentative conclusions that should be taken into account in
the design of fiscal rules also in the European context. First, a weak initial fiscal situation is
a burden for a fiscal rule’s credibility from the perspective of policy makers. This corresponds
to the empirical observation that fiscal rules are often introduced subsequent to a phase of
successful consolidation in order to lock-in earlier adjustment efforts (International Monetary
Fund, 2009). Otherwise, the phasing-in of a new rule should be paralleled by attempts to
remove or at least reduce the problem of unsustainable budgetary legacies such as high initial
debt.
Second, sub-national fiscal rules are a helpful complement to a national rule in a federal
context like Germany where states have substantial spending and deficit autonomy. This
points to the potential credibility effects of consistent and mutually reinforcing fiscal rules
across different layers of government in general. It remains a question for further research
as to whether the experience of the German case also applies to the European context, for
example, for the emerging parallelism of rules at the European Union level (Stability and
Growth Pact) and the national level (induced by the European Fiscal Compact).
Chapter 3 and the related literature show that the desirability of corporate tax har-
monization in the EU remains questionable. First, the descriptives and empirics do not
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make a convincing case for an outright harmonization of corporate taxes. It is unclear how
strong strategic interactions among EU member states really are and whether or not Europe
experiences a “race-to-the-bottom”. In addition, tax revenues have not fallen in line with
statutory tax rates (see, e.g., European Commission, 2014; Devereux and Loretz, 2012).
Second, from a normative perspective, it is unresolved if complete tax harmonization is the
first best solution to tax competition. On the one hand, the empirical results indicate that tax
competition with other regions is unlikely to be very strong, which would make regional tax
harmonization a valid option (Sørensen, 2004). On the other hand, the economic advantages
of harmonization need to be traded off against the disadvantages coming from political
economy factors like governments being Leviathans (see, e.g., Brennan and Buchanan, 1980;
Baskaran and Lopes da Fonseca, 2014).
Also, there are alternative solutions to tax competition which are milder than complete
tax harmonization. The EU Commission has put forward a Common Consolidated Cor-
porate Tax Base (CCCTB) and a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB).87 Both systems
would arguably reduce compliance costs for corporations and make the EU as a whole more
competitive and attractive for international investment (Lang et al., 2013, p. 75).88 At the
same time, member states could still set their own tax rates and preserve some degree of tax
autonomy.
Chapter 4 allows to assess reform options discussed in the OECD’s reports on ‘Base
Ersosion and Profit Shifting’ (BEPS) regarding controlled foreign company rules (CFC rules)
87 The full Draft Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) from 2011
is available for download under: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/
taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/com_2011_121_en.pdf
Information to the CCCTB re-launch in 2015 can be found under: http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-15-5174_de.htm
Please also see the Bolkestein Report (European Commission, 2001) and Spengel et al. (2012) for an
economic analysis of company taxation in the internal market and the CCTB, respectively, as well as
Fuest (2008) for a critical analysis of the EU Commission’s original Draft Council Directive.
88 Also see point 4 of the Preamble of the Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4.
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and intellectual property boxes (IP boxes). First, CFC rules could be strengthened and de-
facto reintroduced. In fact, Action 3 of the OECD’s BEPS project was intended to develop
proposals for effective CFC rules. Although the final report on Action 3 acknowledges
the legal problems of reintroducing CFC rules in the EU, the OECD argues that these
obstacles can be overcome (OECD, 2015c, pp. 17-18). In our computations for this reform
scenario, we observe an improvement for capital export neutrality but not for capital import
neutrality. The desirability of this option of reform is therefore questionable. This supports
the European Commission’s recent proposal to strengthen CFC rules only with respect to
third countries.89
Second, IP boxes for acquired patents could be abolished. This goes into the direction
of the nexus approach proposed by the final report of Action 5 in the BEPS project. It
would limit the extent to which returns from acquired IP would be applicable for the lower
IP box tax rate (OECD, 2015a; OECD, 2015b, pp. 26-28). Our scenario for such a reform
shows very desirable properties because both capital export and import neutrality would be
strengthened. Based on these results, we would recommend that member states completely
abolish IP boxes for acquired IP in their national laws. This would help to achieve more tax
neutrality in the internal market.
Chapter 5 points to a new channel of spatial interactions across jurisdictions through
voters’ direct democratic activities. The study finds that a jurisdiction’s probability of
hosting an initiative is positively driven by the neighbors’ direct democratic activity. This
effect persists over time and is stronger in towns with relatively more information flows
(measured by local newspaper consumption of citizens and total number of commuters across
jurisdictions). Additionally, we find evidence that the results are driven by spillovers in
similar policy areas.
89 Please see Article 8 of the European Commission’s ‘Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules
against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market’ (European
Commission, 2016).
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Given the results of this study, it is well possible that mimicking behavior ultimately
affects fiscal outcomes. This is suggested by the literature which shows that direct democratic
decisions affect fiscal outcomes. Recently, Asatryan et al. (2014) have extended this literature
to Germany. They find that direct democratic activity can affect the level of local tax rates.
Also, voters indirectly shift the weight from taxes which apply to many taxpayers (property
tax) to taxes targeted at fewer taxpayers (business taxes). When considering mimicking in
direct democratic actions, this could give rise to tax interactions across jurisdictions which
previously have solely been explained by learning, coercion, yardstick or tax competition.
Future work should assess in more detail to what extent interactions in policy outcomes are
caused by mimicking behavior in direct democracy.
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A Appendix to Chapter 2
Fiscal Rules and Compliance Expectations - Evidence for the German Debt Brake
Table A.1: Individual and state variables
Variable Unit Explanations
Education:
Tertiary degree Dummy Degree from university or polytechnic
Economics/Business degree Dummy Tertiary education in business or economics
Parliamentary role:
Member of governing parties in state Dummy Member of one of the ruling parties
Member of budget committee Dummy Deals with state government budget
Number of years in parliament Discrete Calculated as 2011/2012 minus year of parliament
entry (interruptions taken into account)
Other demographic variables:
Female Dummy Member of parliament is female
Age in years Discrete Calculated as 2011/2012 minus year of birth
Preferences and bailout-expectation:
Desirability of own state’s uncondi-
tional compliance
Discrete Survey Question: “In 2020, how desirable is it for
your Bundesland to comply with the constitutional
Debt Brake?” Answers given on discrete nine point
scale ranging from -4 (completely undesirable) to +4
(very desirable)
Preference for fiscal consolidation
(debt reduction)
Continuous Survey Question: “Assume that your state’s bud-
get exhibits a permanent surplus (after business cy-
cle adjustment). How would you use this surplus?”
Answer given by distributing a hypothetical 100e
surplus to different budgetary items such as “higher
expenses”, “lesser taxes and fees” and “repayment of
legacy debt”. This variable uses the relative amount
allotted to “repayment of legacy debt” and thus
ranges from 0 to 100.
Index for perceived strength of bud-
get constraint
Discrete Measure ranging from -7 to +7, with higher values
indicating a higher expectation of the debt brake be-
ing enforced in case of non-compliance, see footnote
12 in chapter 2.
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Table A.1: Individual and state variables (cont.)
Variable Unit Explanations
Party affiliation:
CDU/CSU Dummy Member of Christian Democratic or Christian Social
Party, center-right party
FDP Dummy Member of Free Democratic Party (not included into
regressions since it serves as base category), most
market oriented party favoring small government
and low taxes
Green Party Dummy Member of Green Party, center-left with focus on
environmental issues
Left Party Dummy Member of Left Party, uniting former communists in
East Germany and disappointed Social Democrats
from the left wing
SPD Dummy Member of Social Democratic Party, center-left
party
Other Dummy Member of other Party
State characteristics:
GDP per capita Continuous Gross domestic product per capita, in thousands of
Euros, source: German Statistical Office
Need for consolidation Continuous In % of GDP, consolidation needed to comply with
debt brake by the year 2020, source: Sachversta¨ndi-
genrat (2011)
Total debt to GDP Continuous Total debt divided by gross domestic product, in %,
source: German Statistical Office
Three year average budget deficit to
GDP
Continuous Weighted average of the last three budget deficits
(weights: first lag: 0.5, second lag: 0.3, third lag:
0.2) divided by gross domestic product, in %, source:
German Statistical Office
Index of stringency of state debt rule Continuous Normalized between 0 and 1, larger values indicating
stricter rule, source: Ciaglia and Heinemann (2013)
Dummy for consolidation assistance Dummy Takes the value of 1 for states receiving consolidation
assistance
Fiscal equalization transfers to total
spending
Continuous Total net intra-state transfer payments divided by
total spending, in %, sources: Federal Ministry of
Finance, German Statistical Office
Government coalition consists of
right parties
Dummy Takes the value of 1 for a purely right-leaning gov-
ernment (coalition), a value of 0.5 for a mixed gov-
ernment coalition and a value of 0 for a purely left-
leaning government (coalition)
Cross state dimension
Own state Dummy Takes on the value of 1 if the state to be evaluated
it the home state of the respondent
Table A.2: Cross-state compliance expectations
Evaluated states
BB BE BW BY HB HE HH MV NI NW RP SH SL SN ST TH ∅
E
v
a
lu
a
ti
n
g
st
a
te
s
BB 53 5 68 89 0 58 53 11 37 16 32 5 11 68 16 37 35
BE 27 47 83 87 13 80 50 43 60 23 37 27 23 70 40 63 48
BW 5 0 75 94 1 58 22 16 17 9 19 8 4 71 5 19 27
BY 3 3 59 89 3 53 21 4 25 5 17 7 4 61 5 32 24
HB 28 17 83 89 28 72 44 44 67 28 44 22 22 72 44 39 47
HE 16 8 62 82 8 84 32 24 40 16 22 14 14 64 22 38 34
HH 26 13 77 79 5 67 72 36 49 21 41 13 8 59 26 33 39
MV 11 6 78 83 6 59 44 89 28 6 18 6 11 83 17 33 36
NI 4 0 74 91 2 57 24 19 56 11 26 11 6 54 20 26 30
NW 8 6 69 84 2 55 12 25 47 18 31 12 6 63 22 33 31
RP 18 4 80 82 8 68 32 24 40 18 56 16 8 68 26 44 37
SH 10 7 66 86 10 55 17 24 38 10 21 66 10 52 28 31 33
SL 25 10 95 100 10 85 50 25 55 15 35 25 30 60 30 40 43
SN 11 0 67 80 2 42 11 29 20 0 13 4 0 89 16 42 27
ST 28 7 79 86 10 55 31 48 38 17 31 21 21 76 62 48 41
TH 22 11 67 97 11 69 22 31 47 19 33 28 11 89 28 47 40
∅MSP 15 7 72 87 6 62 30 26 38 13 28 15 9 68 22 36
∅State 18 9 74 87 7 64 34 31 41 15 30 18 12 69 25 38
∅15 other states 16 6 74 87 6 62 31 27 40 14 28 15 11 67 23 37
# of times where
outsiders are more
optimistic than in-
siders
0 0 7 5 0 1 0 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 2
Note: Figures are in percent and indicate the share of MSPs who expect that the evaluated state will
be compliant. ∅MSP indicates the average over all MSPs. ∅State indicates the unweighted average over
the state figures.
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Table A.3: Likelihood of state’s compliance - robustness checks 1 (alternative variables for
H1)
(1) (2)
Independent Variables Baseline 1 (with
total debt)
Average
marginal effects
Baseline 1
(with need for
consolidation)
Average
marginal effects
Individual: education
Tertiary degree 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.001
[0.036] [0.010] [0.036] [0.010]
Economics/Business degree 0.024 0.006 0.025 0.007
[0.038] [0.010] [0.037] [0.010]
Individual: parliamentary role
Member of governing parties in state (H4) 0.198*** 0.052*** 0.211*** 0.056***
[0.045] [0.012] [0.045] [0.012]
Member of budget committee -0.164*** -0.044*** -0.163*** -0.044***
[0.039] [0.010] [0.039] [0.010]
Number of years in parliament -0.006** -0.002** -0.006** -0.002**
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Individual: other demographic variables
Female -0.111*** -0.029*** -0.110*** -0.029***
[0.032] [0.009] [0.032] [0.008]
Age in years 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Individual: preferences and bailout-expectation
Desirability of own state’s unconditional compliance 0.068*** 0.018*** 0.067*** 0.018***
[0.011] [0.003] [0.010] [0.003]
Preference for fiscal consolidation (debt reduction) 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.001***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Index for perceived strength of budget constraint (H2) 0.046*** 0.012*** 0.046*** 0.012***
[0.005] [0.001] [0.005] [0.001]
Individual: party affiliationa
CDU/CSU -0.112 -0.030 -0.112 -0.030
[0.069] [0.018] [0.069] [0.018]
SPD -0.155** -0.041** -0.156** -0.042**
[0.074] [0.020] [0.074] [0.020]
Green Party 0.088 0.023 0.090 0.024
[0.085] [0.022] [0.084] [0.022]
Left Party 0.155* 0.041* 0.159* 0.042*
[0.085] [0.022] [0.084] [0.022]
Other Parties -0.123 -0.033 -0.113 -0.030
[0.115] [0.031] [0.114] [0.030]
State characteristicsb
Total debt to GDP (H1) -0.051*** -0.014***
[0.005] [0.001]
Need for consolidation (H1) -0.402*** -0.108***
[0.047] [0.012]
Debt rule index (H3) 1.131*** 0.299*** 1.975*** 0.528***
[0.328] [0.087] [0.291] [0.077]
GDP per capita 0.021*** 0.006*** 0.006 0.002
[0.005] [0.001] [0.005] [0.001]
Dummy for consolidation assistance -0.152 -0.040 -0.738*** -0.197***
[0.116] [0.031] [0.104] [0.027]
Fiscal equalization transfers to GDP 0.096* 0.025* -0.082* -0.022*
[0.054] [0.014] [0.048] [0.013]
Government coalition consists of right parties 0.177** 0.047** 0.591*** 0.158***
[0.077] [0.021] [0.073] [0.019]
Cross state dimension
Own state (H4) 0.789*** 0.209*** 0.770*** 0.206***
[0.089] [0.024] [0.103] [0.027]
Home state fixed effects X X X X
Regression diagnostics
Observations 10,208 10,208
Pseudo-R2 0.266 0.259
p-value joint significance of all variables 0.000 0.000
p-value joint significance of all individual variables 0.000 0.000
p-value joint significance of party-dummies 0.000 0.000
p-value joint significance of state characteristics 0.000 0.000
Notes: */**/*** denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level; Standard errors in brackets; a: base category is the market
oriented liberal democratic party ”FDP”; b: State characteristics are 2010 data for survey waves 1 and 2, which both
took place in 2011, and 2011 data for survey wave 3, which took place in 2012.
Table A.4: Likelihood of state’s compliance - robustness checks 2 (weighting by inverse
response probability based on party and state affiliation)
(1) (2)
Independent Variables Baseline 1
(weighted
regression)
Average
marginal effects
Baseline 2
(weighted
regression)
Average
marginal effects
Individual: education
Tertiary degree 0.011 0.003
[0.040] [0.011]
Economics/Business degree 0.050 0.014
[0.041] [0.011]
Individual: parliamentary role
Member of governing parties in state (H4) 0.169*** 0.046***
[0.045] [0.012]
Member of budget committee -0.176*** -0.048***
[0.043] [0.012]
Number of years in parliament -0.013*** -0.004***
[0.003] [0.001]
Individual: other demographic variables
Female -0.126*** -0.035***
[0.036] [0.010]
Age in years 0.006*** 0.002***
[0.002] [0.000]
Individual: preferences and bailout-expectation
Desirability of own state’s unconditional compliance 0.062*** 0.017***
[0.010] [0.003]
Preference for fiscal consolidation (debt reduction) 0.004*** 0.001***
[0.001] [0.000]
Index for perceived strength of budget constraint (H2) 0.048*** 0.013***
[0.006] [0.002]
Individual: party affiliationa
CDU/CSU -0.125* -0.034*
[0.068] [0.019]
SPD -0.239*** -0.065***
[0.074] [0.020]
Green Party 0.033 0.009
[0.087] [0.024]
Left Party 0.260*** 0.071***
[0.100] [0.027]
Other Parties -0.475*** -0.130***
[0.158] [0.043]
State characteristicsb
Average budget deficit over last three years (H1) -0.310*** -0.085*** -0.556*** -0.110***
[0.032] [0.009] [0.051] [0.010]
Debt rule index (H3) 2.623*** 0.719*** 3.929*** 0.779***
[0.294] [0.079] [0.408] [0.079]
GDP per capita 0.025*** 0.007*** 0.023*** 0.005***
[0.005] [0.001] [0.007] [0.001]
Dummy for consolidation assistance -0.693*** -0.190*** -1.044*** -0.207***
[0.086] [0.023] [0.129] [0.025]
Fiscal equalization transfers to GDP -0.332*** -0.091*** -0.681*** -0.135***
[0.047] [0.013] [0.089] [0.017]
Government coalition consists of right parties 0.598*** 0.164*** 0.792*** 0.157***
[0.071] [0.019] [0.097] [0.019]
Cross state dimension
Own state (H4) 0.843*** 0.231*** 1.295*** 0.257***
[0.121] [0.033] [0.201] [0.039]
Home state fixed effects X X
Person fixed effects X X
Regression diagnostics
Observations 10,208 9,104
Pseudo-R2 0.249 0.448
p-value joint significance of all variables 0.000 0.000
p-value joint significance of all individual variables 0.000 n.a.
p-value joint significance of party-dummies 0.000 n.a.
p-value joint significance of state characteristics 0.000 0.000
Notes: */**/*** denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level; Standard errors in brackets; a: base category is the market
oriented liberal democratic party ”FDP”; b: State characteristics are 2010 data for survey waves 1 and 2, which both
took place in 2011, and 2011 data for survey wave 3, which took place in 2012. Weighting based on inverse response
probabilities which in turn are based on party and state affiliation.
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Table B.3: European Union considerations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU28 Countries EU28 Countries EU28 Countries
VARIABLES uniform distance uniform distance uniform distance
Lagged EATR 0.867*** 0.750*** 0.821*** 0.644*** 0.683*** 0.481***
[0.056] [0.088] [0.085] [0.126] [0.123] [0.166]
Spatial Lag EU15 0.303 0.093 0.317 0.040
[0.342] [0.227] [0.524] [0.295]
Spatial Lag EU13 0.163* 0.143 0.309** 0.291*
[0.084] [0.112] [0.129] [0.175]
Gov’t Consumption (lag) 0.002 -0.016 -0.010 -0.048 -0.047 -0.082
[0.049] [0.058] [0.060] [0.081] [0.072] [0.104]
Urban (lag) 0.048 0.081 0.060 0.111 0.106 0.168*
[0.041] [0.054] [0.052] [0.081] [0.075] [0.100]
Openness (lag) -0.110 -0.333 -0.144 -0.470 -0.467 -0.886
[0.505] [0.747] [0.594] [0.997] [0.886] [1.263]
GDP (lag and ln) 0.307** 0.474* 0.399** 0.710** 0.642* 0.979**
[0.137] [0.254] [0.191] [0.285] [0.342] [0.460]
Dependency (lag) -0.039 -0.051 -0.036 -0.061 -0.077 -0.111
[0.059] [0.090] [0.073] [0.126] [0.120] [0.173]
Observations 448 448 448 448 448 448
Number of countries 28 28 28 28 28 28
Hansen test P-value 0.825 0.682 0.527 0.663 0.476 0.604
AR(1) P-value 0.0233 0.0213 0.0189 0.0139 0.0227 0.0167
AR(2) P-value 0.0899 0.0763 0.0691 0.0752 0.0614 0.0433
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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B.2 Data
B.2.1 Computation of EATR
The concept of Devereux and Griffith (1998, 2003) models a hypothetical investment project
of a company and allows to compute the tax burden on this investment.90 The model
allows to include the most relevant tax provisions for corporations of a country.91 Nominal
corporation tax rates, local taxes on profits and surcharges are included. In addition, real
estate, property and net-wealth taxes are considered. The computations also consider the
depreciation rules for buildings and machinery and the valuation method for inventories.
Overall, the modelled investment is assumed to be financed by a mix of new equity, retained
earnings and debt. In case of debt financing the possibility of interest deductability is taken
into account. Table B.4 states the assumptions with respect to the underlying economic
parameters.
Table B.4: Assumptions for EATR computation
Category Assumption92
Types of assets industrial buildings (0.28%), machinery (0.5%), invento-
ries (0.22%)
Source of finance retained earnings (33.33%), new equity (33.33%), debt
(33.33%)
True economic depreciation (declin-
ing balance)
Buildings: 3.1%
Machinery: 17.5%
Inflation Rate 2%
Real interest rate 5%
Pre-tax rate of return 20%
90 Please also see European Commission (2001) for explanations and applications of the model.
91 Taxation at the level of the shareholder is not taken into account because it does not affect decisions
of corporations when assuming that there is significant international portfolio investment, see e.g.,
Devereux and Pearson (1995, p. 1660).
92 The weights for the assets are the same as used by Davies and Voget (2008). All other parameters are
in line with the effective tax rate studies of ZEW Mannheim.
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B.2.2 Control Variables
Table B.5: Descriptive statistics
Variable Unit Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max Obs. Source
EATR Percent 25.8 7.7 8.3 47.9 748 ZEW/Oxford
Controls:
GDP (ln) USD in Bill. 26.2 1.7 22.3 30.3 748 Worldbank
Gov’t Con-
sumption
% of GDP 18.0 4.5 5.7 29.8 748 Worldbank
Urban Percent 71.8 14.5 26.8 97.5 748 Worldbank
Dependency Percent 49.2 5.1 36.0 66.9 748 Worldbank
Openness (exports + im-
ports)/GDP
0.9 0.5 0.2 3.9 748 Worldbank
The control variables have been used in comparable settings:
Government Consumption: Davies and Voget (2008) and Redoano (2014)
Urban: E.g., Devereux et al. (2008) and Davies and Voget (2008)
Dependency: Davies and Voget (2008), Redoano (2014); implicitly in Overesch and Rincke (2011)
and Crabbe´ (2013).
GDP : E.g., Egger and Raff (2014).
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B.2.3 Dataset
Table B.6: Dataset European countries
Country Country
Austria Latvia
Belgium Lithuania
Bulgaria Luxembourg
Croatia UK
Cyprus Malta
Czech Republic Netherlands
Denmark Norway
Estonia Poland
Finland Portugal
France Romania
Germany Slovakia
Greece Slovenia
Hungary Spain
Italy Sweden
Ireland Switzerland
Turkey
Table B.7: Dataset Non-European countries
Country Country
North America:
USA Canada
Asia-Pacific:
Australia Korea
New Zealand Japan
China India
Indonesia
Latin America:
Mexico Argentina
Brazil Chile
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C Appendix to Chapter 4
Decline of CFC Rules and Rise of IP Boxes: How the European Court of Justice
Affects Tax Competition and Economic Distortions in Europe
C.1 The Devereux-Griffith model for calculating effective average tax rates
The methodology of Devereux and Griffith uses the framework of the neoclassical investment
theory developed in the seminal papers of Jorgenson (1963), Samuelson (1964) and King and
Fullerton (1984). Devereux and Griffith (1999) analyse the impact of taxes on an additional
investment project (in our case acquiring a patent) that temporarily increases the capital
stock of the company by one unit. For the investment, the company has to pay 1 unit in
period t and earns p+ δ units in period t+ 1 . The term p denotes the real financial return
of the investment and δ is the one-period economic depreciation of the investment. The
inflation rate is denoted by pi. The investment is dissolved in period t + 1 which gives the
company additional funds of (1 − δ) · (1 + pi) . For the formulae’s base case, it is assumed
that the investment is financed by retained earnings. Assuming a nominal interest rate i
(and real interest rate r), the pre-tax net present value (NPV) of this investment project in
period t is given by:
R∗ = −1 + 1
1 + i
· [(p+ δ) · (1 + pi) + (1− δ) · (1 + pi)] = p− r
1 + r
(C.1)
If corporate taxes are introduced, two modifications occur. First, the return (p+δ) ·(1+pi) is
taxed at the tax rate τ . Second, the company benefits from tax savings due to depreciation
allowances for corporate income tax purposes whose net present value is A for the whole
lifetime of the acquired asset. The after-tax NPV of the investment project is:
Rdom = −(1− A) + 1
1 + i
· [(p+ δ) · (1 + pi) · (1− τ) + (1− δ) · (1 + pi) · (1− A)] (C.2)
The Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR) for a domestic investment is expressed as:
EATRdom =
R∗ −Rdom
p
1+r
(C.3)
If the investment is conducted via a subsidiary in a source country S, the parent in the home
country H receives the investment’s after-tax NPV as a dividend. Apart from corporate
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taxation in S, taxes on dividends have to be taken into account (σHS).
93 The NPV for the
cross-border investment with a parent company in H and a subsidiary in S is:
RcbHS = −(1−AS)·(1−σHS)+
1− σHS
1 + i
·[(p+δ)·(1+pi)·(1−τs)+(1−δ)·(1+pi)·(1−AS)] (C.4)
Equation (C.4) assumes that the subsidiary finances its investment with retained earnings.
In the base case of our computations, we assume financing with new equity. Following
Devereux and Griffith (1999, p. 45) and Spengel et al. (2015, p. B-16), the subsequent term
has to be added to equation (C.4) when financing with new equity:
F cb,NewEquityHS = −
i · σHS
1 + i
(C.5)
In our robustness section, we additionally consider to finance the investment by debt. In this
case, the parent in H receives interest payments i. Any remaining profits of the subsidiary
are distributed as dividends to the parent. The parameter ωHS comprises how cross-border
interest payments are treated tax-wise. Following Devereux and Griffith (1999, p. 45) and
Spengel et al. (2015, p. B-16), the subsequent term has to be added to equation (C.4) for
computing the NPV of a debt financed cross-border investment:
F cb,DebtHS = −σHS +
σHS · [1 + i · (1− τS)]− i · ωHS
1 + i
(C.6)
93 See Spengel et al. (2015, p. B-15) for details how exemption and credit systems affect equation (C.4).
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C.2 Additional Tables
Table C.1: IP boxes in EU/EEA countries for acquired IP from 2004 to 2014
Country Date of im-
plementation
IP box rate
in 2014 (%)
Main rate in
2014 (%)
Treatment of
current
expenses
Cyprus 2012 2.5 12.5 Net income
France 2000 21.34 38.93 Net income
Hungary 2004 9.5 20.86 Gross income
Liechtenstein 2011 2.5 12.5 Net income
Luxembourg 2008 5.84 29.22 Net income
Malta 2010 0 35 Not deductible
Information on IP boxes is taken from Evers et al. (2015). The slight differences in the
main rates can be explained by a different consideration of local taxes and surcharges. Our
main rates are the same as reported in the publication of Spengel et al. (2015) conducted
on behalf of the European Commission.
It should be noted that IP boxes differ with respect to the treatment of current expenses
(e.g. depreciation). Hungary applies the “gross income approach” which means that
expenses can be deducted at the normal tax rate whereas the corresponding income is
only taxed at the reduced IP box rate. In contrast, the other countries apply the “net
income approach” in which case expenses also have to be deducted at the IP rate. We
take this difference into account.
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Table C.3: Number of countries for which CFC rules are applied (with narrow CFC appli-
cation)
Scenario 2 Scenario 4
Country No IP Boxes IP Boxes implemented
2004 2007 2010 2014 2004 2007 2010 2014
Denmark 8 12 13 13 9 13 16 15
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
France 11 7 7 13 1 1 3 6
Germany 15 18 19 22 16 19 22 25
Greece 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 7
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iceland 0 0 3 3 0 0 6 6
Italy 0 0 5 2 0 0 8 6
Norway 10 12 13 12 12 13 16 15
Portugal 11 13 16 22 12 14 19 25
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UK 13 15 16 7 14 16 19 10
Table C.4: Results for extended application of CFC rules
Year EATRdom EATRout SD(EATRoutH,S) EATR
inb SD(EATRinbH,S)
Scenario 2: Extended CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes do not exist:
2004 25.57 31.13 6.51 31.13 7.07
2007 23.13 27.67 6.89 27.67 7.00
2010 22.00 25.60 6.56 25.60 6.29
2014 21.69 24.99 7.10 24.99 6.53
Scenario 4: Extended CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes exist:
2004 24.59 30.46 7.10 30.46 7.38
2007 21.95 26.76 7.48 26.76 7.32
2010 18.96 23.36 7.15 23.36 7.09
2014 18.03 22.37 7.40 22.37 7.26
Finland, Hungary, Italy (2004-2009) and Sweden (2004-2014) exclude EU/EEA-countries due to double
tax treaties or the use of blacklists/whitelists. In this extended scenario, we abstract from these
restrictions and assume that CFC rules are applicable in an EEA context. Additionally, royalties
constitute CFC income in Spain from 2015 on. We assume in this extended scenario, that CFC rules
have been applicable to royalty income since 2004.
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Table C.5: Number of countries for which CFC rules are applied (broad CFC definition)
Scenario 2 Scenario 4
Country No IP Boxes IP Boxes implemented
2004 2007 2010 2014 2004 2007 2010 2014
Denmark 8 12 13 13 9 13 16 15
Finland 8 7 7 3 9 9 11 6
France 11 7 7 13 1 1 3 6
Germany 15 18 19 22 16 19 22 25
Greece 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 7
Hungary 0 2 3 2 0 2 5 5
Iceland 0 0 3 3 0 0 6 6
Italy 5 7 5 2 6 9 8 6
Norway 10 12 13 12 12 13 16 15
Portugal 11 13 16 22 12 14 19 25
Spain 20 22 20 22 21 23 23 25
Sweden 2 4 5 2 3 5 8 6
UK 13 15 16 7 14 16 19 10
Table C.6: Results for a pre-tax return of 15%
Year EATRdom EATRout SD(EATRoutH,S) EATR
inb SD(EATRinbH,S)
Scenario 1: CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes do not exist:
2004 25.32 29.54 7.56 29.54 6.21
2007 22.79 25.55 7.80 25.55 5.47
2010 21.63 23.28 7.74 23.28 4.34
2014 21.29 22.62 8.00 22.62 4.05
Scenario 2: CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes do not exist:
2004 25.32 30.17 6.86 30.17 6.32
2007 22.79 26.46 7.21 26.46 6.08
2010 21.63 24.52 6.93 24.52 5.39
2014 21.29 23.99 7.34 23.99 5.59
Scenario 3: CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes exist:
2004 24.29 28.68 8.29 28.68 6.39
2007 21.53 24.43 8.81 24.43 5.67
2010 18.52 20.30 9.01 20.30 4.62
2014 17.60 19.28 9.32 19.28 4.53
Scenario 4: CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes exist:
2004 24.29 29.35 7.65 29.35 6.62
2007 21.53 25.39 8.07 25.39 6.35
2010 18.52 21.98 7.74 21.98 6.07
2014 17.60 21.05 7.95 21.05 6.13
Note: EATRdom corresponds to the (unweighted) average of the 31 country-specific EATRdom. Each
country faces 30 outbound and inbound possibilities. The two columns EATRout and EATRinb show
the mean over all cross-border EATRs (31 × 30= 930 cases). The two remaining columns show the
mean standard deviation over the 31 countries for outbound and inbound investments.
Table C.7: Results for a pre-tax return of 25%
Year EATRdom EATRout SD(EATRoutH,S) EATR
inb SD(EATRinbH,S)
Scenario 1: CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes do not exist:
2004 25.71 29.67 7.31 29.67 5.81
2007 23.34 25.93 7.51 25.93 5.12
2010 22.22 23.76 7.34 23.76 4.06
2014 21.93 23.18 7.70 23.18 3.79
Scenario 2: CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes do not exist:
2004 25.71 30.32 6.61 30.32 5.95
2007 23.34 26.76 7.03 26.76 5.72
2010 22.22 24.90 6.57 24.90 5.02
2014 21.93 24.39 7.11 24.39 5.18
Scenario 3: CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes exist:
2004 24.78 28.89 7.89 28.89 5.98
2007 22.20 24.91 8.20 24.91 5.31
2010 19.22 20.90 8.50 20.90 4.34
2014 18.29 19.87 8.98 19.87 4.26
Scenario 4: CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes exist:
2004 24.78 29.55 7.27 29.55 6.21
2007 22.20 25.77 7.63 25.77 5.94
2010 19.22 22.48 7.28 22.48 5.69
2014 18.29 21.54 7.64 21.54 5.76
Note: EATRdom corresponds to the (unweighted) average of the 31 country-specific EATRdom. Each
country faces 30 outbound and inbound possibilities. The two columns EATRout and EATRinb show
the mean over all cross-border EATRs (31 × 30= 930 cases). The two remaining columns show the
mean standard deviation over the 31 countries for outbound and inbound investments.
Table C.8: Results for optimal financing of subsidiary (retained earnings, new equity or
debt)
Year EATRdom EATRout SD(EATRoutH,S) EATR
inb SD(EATRinbH,S)
Scenario 1: CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes do not exist:
2004 25.57 26.70 6.50 26.70 4.52
2007 23.13 23.44 6.51 23.44 3.97
2010 22.00 21.67 6.43 21.67 3.39
2014 21.69 21.21 6.52 21.21 3.25
Scenario 2: CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes do not exist:
2004 25.57 27.50 5.91 27.50 5.05
2007 23.13 24.42 6.02 24.42 5.06
2010 22.00 22.89 5.73 22.89 4.70
2014 21.69 22.52 5.93 22.52 5.03
Scenario 3: CFC rules are not applicable and IP box regimes exist:
2004 24.59 25.93 7.17 25.93 4.64
2007 21.95 22.46 7.42 22.46 4.10
2010 18.96 19.07 7.84 19.07 3.55
2014 18.03 18.23 8.21 18.23 3.54
Scenario 4: CFC rules are in place and IP box regimes exist:
2004 24.59 26.73 6.59 26.73 5.24
2007 21.95 23.49 6.81 23.49 5.28
2010 18.96 20.74 6.71 20.74 5.35
2014 18.03 20.02 6.88 20.02 5.48
Note: EATRdom corresponds to the (unweighted) average of the 31 country-specific EATRdom. Each
country faces 30 outbound and inbound possibilities. The two columns EATRout and EATRinb show
the mean over all cross-border EATRs (31 × 30= 930 cases; each case represents the most beneficial
financing option). The two remaining columns show the mean standard deviation over the 31 countries
for outbound and inbound investments.
D Appendix to Chapter 5
Vetoing and Inaugurating Policy Like Others Do: Evidence on Spatial Interac-
tions in Voter Initiatives
Figure D.1: Geographical distribution of initiatives in German towns from 2002 to 2014
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Table D.2: First-stage results of Table 5.1 - determinants of citizen-initiatives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLE Spatial lag citizen initiatives
t t− 1 t− 2 t− 3
∑N
j 6=i(wj×signature requirement j) -0.1233*** -0.1366*** -0.0677*** -0.1374*** -0.1876***
(0.0169) (0.0341) (0.0245) (0.0185) (0.0306)∑N
j 6=i(wj×ln population j) 0.0022 0.0051* 0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0014
(0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0026)∑N
j 6=i(wj×unemployment share j) -0.0876*** -0.0812** -0.1363*** -0.1095*** -0.1706***
(0.0308) (0.0315) (0.0310) (0.0331) (0.0419)∑N
j 6=i(wj×share of population over 65 j) 0.1997** 0.1423 0.1669* 0.3585*** 0.3222**
(0.0866) (0.0872) (0.0950) (0.1021) (0.1426)∑N
j 6=i(wj×left share j) -0.0125 -0.0149 -0.0032 0.0121 -0.0092
(0.0107) (0.0135) (0.0108) (0.0132) (0.0139)
Signature requirement i 0.0222 -0.0319 0.0007 -0.0007
(0.0320) (0.0253) (0.0223) (0.0265)
Ln population i 0.0025 0.0040* 0.0022 -0.0006
(0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0035)
Unemployment rate i -0.0044 0.0092 -0.0036 0.0457***
(0.0085) (0.0093) (0.0115) (0.0150)
Share of population over 65 i 0.0037 0.0063 0.0119 0.0081
(0.0048) (0.0063) (0.0077) (0.0087)
Left share i -0.0048* -0.0041 0.0061 0.0009
(0.0026) (0.0033) (0.0052) (0.0052)
Observations 102,878 101,670 90,990 81,283 71,701
R-squared 0.0763 0.0790 0.0811 0.0844 0.0964
Number of municipalities 11,149 11,128 9,940 9,723 9,435
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The table presents the results for the OLS first stage estimation of the model specified
in equation 5.2. All regressions include time and municipal fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the county level.
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Figure D.2: Spillover effects over time
−
1
0
1
2
sp
at
ia
l la
g 
po
in
t e
st
im
at
e
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
time
Second stage effects  of spillovers from neighbors’ initiatives
This graph shows the point estimates with 95% confidence intervals of the spatial lag
estimated from equation (5.1). Spatial lags contain municipalities within a radius
of 50 km. All regressions include time, municipal fixed effects and the control
variables as defined before. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
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